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ABSTRACT 
Recently, the world has been affected by man-made and natural disasters of a 
level not shown before which depicts the importance of communication for an efficient 
and rapid response of First Responder Community (FRC) members in the field. 
The resilience of communication infrastructure is vital for the well being of any 
country. It is essential to build a robust and interoperable Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure before the disaster, which will facilitate 
patch/restore/reconstruct it when and after the disaster hits.  
Overviews for most ICT standards currently available are introduced. This 
background is needed for any emergency communication interoperability plan. 
Training is very important so that staffs will be ready when needed to implement 
the emergency plans. Exercises such as Strong Angel III (SAIII) are always the best 
approach to explore different ICT systems and these systems resilience in the case of 
disaster in the context of power, range, and interoperability. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Jordan) may benefit from studying the U.S’s 
experience in emergency communications and may consider modifying its 
communications interoperability plans and improve its infrastructure to enhance 
readiness for disasters. The author explored Jordan’s current emergency communications 
interoperability plans, policies, Emergency Operation Plans (EOPs) and compared 
Jordan’s HA/DR communications readiness level versus that of the U.S. 
Based on the technological aspects of emergency communications, Jordan’s 
communications environment, the requirements analysis of emergency communications 
plan, and lessons learned from the U.S. experience, a proposed Jordan Emergency 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Recently, the world has been affected by man-made and natural disasters of a 
level not shown before which depicts the importance of communication for an efficient 
and rapid response of First Responder Community (FRC) members in the field. 
The resilience of communication infrastructure is vital for the well-being of any 
country. It is essential to build a robust and interoperable Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure before the disaster, which will facilitate 
patch, restore, and reconstruct it when and after the disaster hits.  
Overviews for most ICT standards currently available are introduced. This 
background is needed to furnish for emergency communication interoperability plan. 
Training is very important so that FRC members will be ready when 
implementing the emergency communications plans. Exercises such as Strong Angel III 
(SAIII) are normally an excellent approach to explore different ICT systems and its 
resilience in case of disaster in the context of power, range, and interoperability. 
Jordan may benefit from studying the U.S.’s experience in emergency 
communications and may consider modifying its communications interoperability plans 
and improve its infrastructure to enhance readiness for disasters. The author explored 
Jordan’s current emergency communications interoperability plans, policies, Emergency 
Operation Plans (EOPs) and compares Jordan’s HA/DR communications readiness level 
versus that of the U.S. 
Based on the technological aspects of emergency communications, Jordan’s 
communications environment, the requirements analysis of emergency communications 
plan, and lessons learned from the U.S. experience, a proposal for Jordan’s Emergency 
Communications Interoperability Plan (JECIP) is introduced in this thesis. 
The Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) environment, 
peacekeeping, or Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) activities are aspects of the 
interoperability plan as Jordan is also playing a big role in UN peacekeeping missions.  
The current emergency communications interoperability plan needs to be revised 
to account for new methods and techniques of response to various emergencies both 
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internally within Jordan and in terms of potential interoperability in a multi-national 
peacekeeping or HA/DR response such as the Pakistan earthquake of February 2006 or 
the Southeast Asia tsunami of December 2004. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Southeast Asian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2006 Pakistan 
earthquake have emphasized the need for efficient communications and triggered 
improvements in this field. ICT systems are vital for response time reduction and to 
increase chances for an efficient usage of resources. 
Another domain for emergency communications interoperability planning is the 
United Nation (UN) peacekeeping missions. Jordan along with other countries is 
contributing to these missions all over the world and we all have to work together in the 
same HA/DR environment. The peacekeeping forces are deployed most of the time in 
areas with no ICT infrastructure and need a plan which articulates policies, capabilities, 
and technologies to build an interoperable ICT network that would help the troops 
conducting their humanitarian role in harmony with other agencies and local government. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this thesis is to study current infrastructure capabilities in Jordan 
to facilitate building an interoperable ICT infrastructure which is resilient to disasters. 
ICT systems that are interoperable with other nations in a possible multi-national disaster 
response, especially in peacekeeping missions, are vital for the purpose of more 
efficiency and reliability in responding to an emergency. Jordan may benefit from the 
lessons learned and plans revised after Katrina in U.S. and could use these lessons to 
create a better emergency communications interoperability plan. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 




a. What are the concepts and terminologies used in emergency 
communications for disaster response? 
b. What are the new technologies that may be used to enhance 
communication infrastructure resilience and patch in case of 
emergency? 
c. What is Jordan’s ICT environment? 
2. Analysis 
a. What are the requirements for a better emergency communications 
interoperability plan in Jordan? 
b. How can Jordan use the U.S. expertise in the domain of emergency 
communications interoperability? 
c. What should Jordan do to improve its preparedness in the domain 
of emergency communications interoperability and what are the 
guidelines to build a viable emergency communications 
interoperability plan for Jordan? 
3. Synthesis 
a. What is the emergency communications interoperability plan for 
an interoperable infrastructure in Jordan? 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Again, this thesis is organized into the three categories mentioned above: 
1. Survey 
This category is divided into four chapters: Chapter II discusses disaster response 
Preparedness: Training & Exercises. Lessons learned from U.S. experience are elaborated 
in Chapter III. Chapter IV surveys emergency communications interoperability plan 
requirements. Communication technologies overview is elaborated in Chapter V.  
2. Analysis 
This category is comprised of Chapter VI; titled as Jordan’s Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) Environment. 
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3. Synthesis 
This category is divided into two chapters: Jordan’s Emergency Communications 
Interoperability Plan (JCIP) is proposed in Chapter VII. Conclusions and future works are 







II. DISASTER RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS: TRAINING & 
EXERCISES  
Disasters usually happen by surprise. For this reason, the First Responders 
Community (FRC) should have or obtain the proper training and education in their 
specialty. It is important that all personnel from all agencies concerned with disaster 
response learn the same language and terminologies used in the emergency management 
community.  
This may be called “procedural interoperability” which is different from 
“communications interoperability.” FRC members are trained on Incident Command 
System (ICS) for the purpose of better procedural interoperability among them as they 
may be responding to a disaster or other event from different agencies and sometimes 
from different countries [4]. 
Scholars and researchers often study disasters that have already happened to 
extract the lessons to be learned and try to identify the flaws to be avoided in the future.  
In this Chapter, disaster response training and exercises are elaborated as part of 
the study process of this thesis. Definitions and terms used in these events and in this 
learning process are to be embedded in this thesis — terms such as Hastily Formed 
Network (HFN), HA/DR, Stability & Reconstruction (S&R), etc., so that the reader can 
follow the information presented. 
Training is very important so that staffs will be ready when needed to implement 
the emergency plans. Exercises are often the best approach to get the best training in the 
emergency domain as theory by itself without proper testing will not be enough. 
In this thesis, communications training for better interoperability is focused on. 
There are three communications equipment training categories: maintenance, operations, 
and the procurement process. User requirements for the communication systems to be 
acquired are the responsibility of the agency; which need a knowledgeable staff in this 
regard. System requirements are the task for the vendors of these systems. 
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A. STRONG ANGEL III (SAIII) [3] 
As part of this thesis study, the author participated in the SAIII exercise as an 
observer. SAIII was held at San Diego, California, USA from 21 to 26 of August 2006. 
Multiple locations were used to simulate a widespread epidemic in the city accompanied 
by a cyber attack on the communications infrastructure and information systems. 
This exercise was a very rich experience as it was a gathering of numerous elite 
companies, government agencies, and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). The 
Strong Angel III exercise was a series of experiments implemented with an assumption of 
response to a disaster. Participants were volunteers from both public and private sectors. 
The experiments and demonstrations enhanced the integration of technologies and 
techniques for information flow and cooperation between different companies, 
government, NGOs, and militaries to fulfill the goal of fast and efficient humanitarian 
relief for victims of natural disasters and wars. 
The Strong Angel idea was started after the Kosovo refugee migration. The 
problems facing the responders in the field were put together and addressed. Participants 
worked on solutions at Strong Angel I (SAI) which took place in Hawaii, USA in June of 
2000. SAI simulated a refugee camp with a distributed medical intelligence 
communications infrastructure. Strong Angel II (SAII) was held in Hawaii, USA in the 




Figure 1.   A photo from SAIII opening (From: [3]). 
 
These locations were connected using different technologies to test reliability and 
resilience of ICT systems throughout the course of implementation of the different tasks 
of SAIII. SAIII tried to match people in need of solutions to problems (experienced when 
working with disasters such as the Tsunami) with people who had solutions to those 
problems.  
Solutions were not necessarily technology-based. Some of the problems could be 
solved using social networks or building trust at a human to human level between parties 
working on the tasks. Some of the companies were exploring a method to integrate their 
solutions with other companies’ solutions which would make these solutions more robust 
and efficient.  
This SAIII exercise tried to generate ideas and techniques that would overcome 
boundary problems, such as public/private sector partnership, local/non-local authorities, 
national/international domain members, and civil/military relationships. Other common 
problems that were dealt with included networks, geography, language, and culture. 
While Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems were a key 
issue addressed during SAIII, there were approximately fifty technical tasks addressed by 
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SAIII’s leadership team.  Loss of communications during an emergency response is 
devastating to the whole mission. Technologies and techniques are needed to address this 
important issue.  
Different solutions and platforms were tested and challenged. Communications 
networks, including ad-hoc mesh networks, SMS text messaging, and wireless systems 
technologies were employed. Interoperability, integration, mobility, power supplies, 
imaging, and mapping were the main technological challenges focused on during the 
SAIII exercise. 
The core of the exercise which is relevant to our research was the disruption in the 
normal communications. Regardless of the specific applications (such as chat and e-mail) 
used by the First Responders Community (FRC) members; the basis is ICT infrastructure 
restoration. Participants had to patch the communications infrastructure up utilizing 
technologies offered by vendors. 
B. THE CEBROWSKI INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION AND 
INFORMATION SUPERIORITY [15] 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, USA; the 
Cebrowski Institute for Innovation and Information Superiority has organized a weekly 
gathering throughout Fiscal Year 2006 to discuss the research and projects surrounding 
the concept of Hastily Formed Networks (HFN). 
This series of group discussions hosted speakers from different disciplines and 
agencies related to the domain of disaster management. Some of these concepts are 
explained here: 
1. Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) 
Networks typically mature slowly and they can be enhanced through continuous 
observation during their lifetime. HFN is a network that is formed and configured rapidly 
in response to emergency situations with limited life span.  HFNs must be prepared and 
designed before they are needed. Despite their limited life span, it is possible to identify 
best practices in how they can be effectively prepared, staffed, and executed [15]. 
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Figure 2.   Three Basic HFN Components: Reach-Back, Last-Mile, and Fly Away Kit 
(FLAK) (From: [16]). 
 
HFN networks maintenance philosophy, personnel training, procurement strategy, 
and security should be clear to all agencies so they will not improvise and will not work 
in disarray in case of disaster. 
2. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
HA/DR is a concept which can be measured to evaluate the level of services 
offered by the First Responders Community (FRC) to victims in the field based on two 
dimensions: time & location. High level of HA/DR means less time elapsed for help to 
arrive at the location of a disaster. 
HA/DR includes all actions taken in terms of humanitarian aid assistance, 
evaluating medical needs, underlying economic concerns, and works together to help the 
people affected by the disaster.  
3. Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) 
The term S&R includes capacity enhancement, training, and infrastructure 
reconstruction programs such as restoring electricity and normal Internet infrastructure in 
post-disaster environment (without the disaster patches) and to train maintenance staff for 
it. 
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4. Stability, Security, Transition & Reconstruction (SSTR) 
The SSTR concept has more roles added to the S&R definition in terms of 
enhancing local and regional security capacity through collaborative efforts. Transitions 
deal with critical time frames in the case of cease fire negotiation between parties, or the 
time frames after a natural disaster and before the active reconstruction plans are 
implemented. 
5. Complex Humanitarian Emergency (CHE) 
CHEs are man-made disasters (such as civil or other wars) which cause mortality 
and destruction more than most natural and technological disasters. It is important for the 
international agencies in this case to understand the political and social situation in the 
disaster region. Health care is one of the key issues in this kind of emergency. 
6. Complex Humanitarian Disaster (CHD) 
 CHDs are natural event caused disasters, which can be unpredictable in terms of 
time and size.   The key issue in this kind of disaster is time, as assistance can take a lot 
of time to be sent to remote locations. 
7. Social Networks 
While technology is an important aspect of the emergency response in terms of 
providing people in the field with communication and data networks with high 
availability and robust continuous service, human resources are also extremely important 
and vital for the success of the mission. Building social networks will make use of these 
systems and facilitate the implementation of the objectives on the ground. 
8. Critical infrastructures and Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection for 
Disaster Reduction  
The definition of Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CI/KR) “is 
organizations and facilities of major importance to the community whose failure or 
impairment would cause a sustained shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to public 
order or other dramatic consequences” [22]. 
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The outcome of hazard and vulnerability analysis for the Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) will be a pyramid, which depicts the effect of the asset on the life of population, 
especially in case of disasters. Each country or enterprise should categorize their assets 
and rank them according to the pyramid shown in Figure 3. Note that communication 
infrastructure is starting to climb up to the top.  
 
 
Figure 3.   Critical Infrastructure Risk of Failure (After: [22]). 
 
9. The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) 
The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (DRMC) clarifies how the stages: Pre-
Disaster, Response, and Post-Disaster correlate with Risk Assessment, Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Warning/Evacuation, and Assessing Damage.  The threshold point in this 
cycle is the Warning/Evacuation point. If this point is accurately predicted, a lot of people 
will be saved and immediate assistance will be provided to them. Figure 4 depicts the 




Figure 4.   The Disaster Risk Management Cycle (From: [25]). 
 
C. FIRST REGIONAL MEDICAL CONFERENCE ON DISASTER 
MANAGEMENT 
Organized by the Jordanian Royal Medical Services (JRMS) of Jordan’s Armed 
Forces (JAF), the First Regional Medical Conference on Disaster Management was held 
in Amman-Jordan from November 1-3, 2007. The author participated by submitting a 
paper titled “Analysis of Jordan’s Emergency Communication Interoperability Plan 
(JECIP) for Disaster Response.”  
Although the main theme of the conference was medical aspects of disaster 
management, several papers discussed issues such as: “Using Computer Modeling and 
Simulation as a Foundation of Disaster Preparedness,” “National Strategy for Emergency 
Preparedness in Jordan,” and other subjects. 
Participants from several countries such as the U.S., Turkey, UAE, and Palestine 
exchanged their experiences and knowledge. Part of the conference was an exercise 
conducted by the Jordanian Royal Medical Services (JRMS) along with the Corps of 
Engineering of JAF and other agencies. The scenario of the exercise was comprised of a 
chemical attack and the evacuation of casualties out of the area as well as apparent 
contamination to hospitals [42]. 
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The conference emphasized the fact that telemedicine and other related 
applications will not work without a robust and interoperable communications 
infrastructure. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, terms and concepts in the context of First Responders Community 
(FRC) were elaborated on so that the reader will have the minimum background for the 































III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S. EXPERIENCE IN 
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 
Jordan and the U.S. are different in size, economy, and government organization; 
but many of aspects of disaster management are still valid for both countries. 
The concepts and objectives in the two countries’ emergency interoperability 
communications plans are almost identical. The differences between them are due to the 
different political systems which will result in a change of the chain of command and 
responsibilities. Another reason for the difference is the technical and funding levels of 
both countries.  
In this chapter, the U.S. experience in emergency communications interoperability 
is elaborated on. Other concepts such as modularization model, interoperability types 
used by agencies when they cannot talk to each other, and the procurement process for 
interoperable communications equipment are also presented. 
A. INFORMATION SYSTEM MODULARITY MODEL [1] 
The First Responders Community (FRC) relies on voice radio in communicating 
with each other in the field while ignoring issues such as trunking multiple conversations. 
Packet-Switching (becoming the dominant over Circuit-Switching (CS)) as voice is 
considered as an application of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).  
To enhance interoperability, a common modularity model or architecture between 
multiple agencies is needed.  The standards are only the means to define the interfaces. 
The core requirement for interoperability of the communications network is that 
all the segments be routable networks such as WiMAX, WiFi, and all of the cabled 
Internet technologies. 
Radio-Wide Area Networks (Radio-WANs) requires specific characteristics to be 
used in emergency situations. Outside characteristics: Each segment should be a routable 
network.  Internal characteristics: Stable Media Access Control (MAC), ability to 
Multicast, infrastructure protection security, and fault detection. 
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The objective of architecture is to prescribe a common modularization model 
for all information systems. The main goal achieved by this modularization is a 
decoupling of the end systems from the radio-WANs. A good modularized component 
should have the following interfaces:  
1. LAN Interface  
Routable interfaces; such as Ethernet interface; is the common LAN interface. 
Non-routable data links are not a plausible solution.  
2. Messaging or Data Packaging Interface 
 E-mail user agents support digital signature and encryption (Public and Private 
Keys).  
3. PKI Interface 
 In information systems, authenticity mechanism is of core importance. 
Confidentiality requires additional to authenticity.  
4. QoS Interface 
 QoS is not necessary for end systems if the best effort delivery mechanisms of 
the Internet are adequate.  
5. Management Interface 
 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) interface is in the form of the 
required Management Information Base (MIB).  
B. INTEROPERABILITY REFERENCE MODEL (IRM) [1] 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems interoperability 
needs standards to articulate the module boundaries after the modularization 
is performed. There are two backdrops of standards: the first is to use standards to dictate 
technology choices. The second is to use standards to avoid modularity.  
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Similar to the ISO Reference Model, the Interoperability Reference Model (IRM) 
is intended to perform the same function for interoperable information systems as the ISO 
Reference Model does for interoperable networks to organize the discussion. Table 1 
depicts the model components.  
The top three elements in the IRM are based on human factors while the 
bottom four layers are based on Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and 
Intelligence (C4I). The objective of IRM is to create an information system with a set of 
interchangeable parts that can be assembled and reassembled (this can be called a 
prescriptive architecture). 
 
1 Doctrinal interoperability A human factor that leads to coherency and 
uniformity of action. 
2 Cognitive or shared situational 
awareness 
Information systems are interoperable at 
this layer if decision makers in two different 
systems are seeing coherent pictures of the 
information presented. 
3 Interoperable procedures This is the domain long inhabited by Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) or Tactics, 
Techniques & Procedures (TT&P). 
4 Shared processes This is a software engineering concept. At 
its trivial level reusable code 
obviously enhances interoperability but that is a 
side effect of what is essentially an economy effort 
in code production. 
5 Data Element interoperability It is a clear requisite to information 
system interoperability. 
6 Information system modularity 
 
Refers to development of a complex product 
(or process) from smaller subsystems that can be 
designed independently. 
7 Internetworkability Communications interoperability can be defined 
by ability to Internetwork. 
Table 1.   A Proposal for an Interoperability Reference Model (IRM) (After: [1]). 
 
1. Doctrinal Interoperability 
Doctrinal interoperability is a human factor that leads to coherency and 
uniformity of action. When different decision makers are exposed to the same 
 18
information, they will make similar decisions. This model abstracts discussion to where it 
belongs and will not eliminate the doctrinal tensions of uniformity against creativity. This 
layer may be divided into tactical, operational and strategic sub-layers.  
2. Cognitive Interoperability 
Cognitive interoperability is based on shared situation awareness between decision 
makers; as if they see a coherent picture of the information presented, the information 
systems will be interoperable. 
3. Interoperable Procedures 
 This layer is comprised of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) or Tactics, 
Techniques & Procedures (TTP’s). An example for this layer, multi-agency Command and 
Control, is enhanced by an Incident Command System (ICS) used by emergency service 
providers.  
4. Shared Processes 
 A software engineering concept for code production, reusable code 
enhances interoperability especially for mobile and portable code. 
SOA or SaaS or ERP inhabits this layer (although they may overlap into others).  
5. Data  
Data element interoperability and coherent data dictionaries are essential for 
information system interoperability.  
6. Modularity 
Modularity refers to smaller subsystems that can be designed independently to 
develop a complex system. Poor modularization manifests itself in poor life cycle 
maintainability. Two steps are necessary for reusable components:  
First: decoupling of end systems from the communications; which allows the change 
of one subsystem without the other. Second: modularity between end systems; which 
allows the usage of a Sense module from one information system to feed data to a Decision 
one in another.  
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7. Internetwork  
Communications interoperability is based on Internetworkability between two 
systems.  
C. U.S. EXPERIENCE IN INTEROPERABILITY ENHANCEMENT 
In the U.S., the Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated a national communications program 
(SAFECOM) to bring focus to interoperability issues. Communications interoperability is 
defined by the SAFECOM program as follows:  “The ability of public safety agencies to 
talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging 
voice and/or data with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and as 
authorized.”[18] 
1. The National Taskforce on Interoperability (NTFI). 
Following the 9/11 incident in the U.S., the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), 
Office of Science and Technology organized the National Task Force on Interoperability 
(NTFI), a task force that has members from eighteen national associations that address 
the problem of communications interoperability. 
NTFI conducted many studies on emergency communications interoperability and 
reported out five important reasons why the public safety agencies cannot talk to each 
others.  They are as follows [18]: 
a. Incompatible Equipment 
Incompatible and aging communications equipment used by agencies and 
at the same time, neighboring agencies have migrated to higher frequency bands, digital 
channels, and trunked systems causes the lack of interoperability. Replacing the 
equipment with routable networks will solve this problem. 
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b. Limited and Fragmented Funding  
Lack of funding will hinder the replacement of aging incompatible 
equipment, restricting human resources available, focusing on internal operational needs, 
limiting access to the frequency spectrum resources. 
c. Limited and Fragmented Planning  
Lack of planning will result different agencies competing for limited funds 
which will provide few resources for inter-agency planning efforts and that may 
compound the interoperability problem by demoting cooperation and joint operating 
plans that define communications needs. 
d. Lack of Coordination and Cooperation  
To promote coordination, certain steps may be taken: reduce isolated 
spending, increase sharing of management and control, and enhance infrastructure 
sharing such as towers and sometimes full systems.  
e. Limited and Fragmented Radio Spectrum 
ICT systems are technologically incompatible at a fundamental level if 
they are using different frequency bands. Agencies seeking to upgrade their systems are 
forced to move to a higher frequency bands to find available channels.  
2. Reactive Inter-agency Interoperability Types  
The SAFECOM program has identified five critical elements to solving inter-
agency communications problems: Governance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), 
training and exercises, frequency of use, and technology. There are five technological 
means of inter-agency communications: swapping radios, using gateways between 
independent systems, sharing channels, sharing proprietary systems, and sharing 
standard-based systems [18]. 
Interoperability types used by agencies when they cannot talk to each others may 
be defined by the public safety community in the following variants: 
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a. Swap radios (SR)  
The dispatching or responsible agency for the Command, Control, and 
Communications (C3) in the field will swap radios when other FRC members arrive at 
the location of a disaster.  
b. Talkaround (TKR)  
When losing the ability to talk back to the dispatch center, FRC members 
may utilize the radio-to-radio functionality.   
c. Mutual Aid Channel (MAC)  
In case of agencies which operate on separate frequencies, these channels 
have set aside frequencies and pre-programmed them to utilize these channels in case of 
inter-agency communications during the event. 
d. Gateway Console Patch (GCP)  
The gateway console is designed to patch two or more radio systems to 
communicate in case of emergencies. There are many types of GCP such as: interface 
with other Radio Frequency (RF) links, 4-wire audio links, and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) links.  
e. Network Roaming (NR)  
Network roaming is when the infrastructure topology is based on a single 
common air interface; which is able to accept multiple vendors’ mobile equipment.  
f. Standards Based Shared Networks (SBSN)  
Standards may be used as a baseline for an evaluation tool for system 
levels of interoperability. An example for these standards is Project 25 (P25) published 
by the Telecommunication Industry Association (TIA) and is an industry standard for 
voice and data transmissions.  
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3. Communications Interoperability Project Management 
When planning for communications interoperability, there are elements to be 
considered in that project: field operations radio users, field operations command staff, 
executive officers of fire; police; and medical agencies, dispatch management, technical 
support staff, emergency management officials, elected officials, media, and the public. 
These projects are very difficult to manage because they are large, expensive, and 
multi-agency in nature, are built on a variety of complex technologies, require 
environmental/historical and cultural assessments of sites, and finally depend on 
frequency licenses.   In the balance life or death may be on the line out of these services.  
To build an interoperable communications infrastructure, four questions need to 
be answered regarding the plan project [18]: 
a. What?  
A needs analysis is the organized process of collecting information on 
what interoperable system needs. 
b. Why?  
ICT systems interoperability is achieved through a system of systems 
(technological and operational).  
c. Who?  
Agency executives and senior managers should build this foundation of 
agreement.  
d. When?  
Immediately, as nobody knows when a disaster strikes or when funding 
may go to a less important project.  
There are steps to conduct interoperability needs analysis: determine user 
needs, develop operational requirements, and evaluate build-versus-buy options. To build 
a plausible interoperability project, a survey for existing radio sites is needed in the 
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following context: Safety and security of the site permits legitimate maintenance and may 
keep away unwanted visitors, so the question must be asked whether or not there is e a 
space for the antenna systems?  Further, does the equipment rack have space for radios 
and combining equipment? 
To find out if the power distribution units suit the needs for the site, the 
electrical Radio Frequency (RF) grounding should meet the industry standards, to make 
sure that the site has a suitable monitoring system for tower lights, power systems, and 
security controls. 
Communication interoperability depends on evolving factors such as level 
of communications needs, developing technologies (especially wireless networks), and 
the public understanding of those concepts. 
Communications technical requirements could be categorized and defined 
with one or more qualities, such as the following: 
To plan for enhanced interoperability, key elements should be addressed. 
A concept of Interoperability Continuum gathers these elements for successful planning 
for a robust interoperability solution as depicted in Figure 5. Technology, training, 
equipment, Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), and governance are some of these 
key issues. When procurement for new equipment should be proposed, this proposal will 












Figure 5.   Interoperability Continuum (From: [18]). 
 
D. PROCUREMENT PROCESS FOR INTEROPERABLE 
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT  
For the equipment acquisition process, Jordan may benefit from the U.S. 
procurement cycle. U.S. federal government uses the Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contracts. This means that one vendor will be awarded a contract which 
will be open for other agencies to acquire equipment with the same terms and conditions. 
In other words, Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) of Jordan, 
for example, is to award a contract to a vendor with a promise to buy a minimum amount 
off the contract to make it economical for that vendor. The contract is then opened to all 
agencies in Jordan so they will buy from the same source. IDIQ is a procurement process 
that brings interoperability through commonality [40]. 
To assure vendors eligibility, some sort of interoperability testing mechanism is 
needed.  The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) conducts this process through their Joint 
Interoperability Test Center (JITC) [43]. 
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Interoperable communications between agencies during mutual aid events is the 
aim of this procurement process. Good modularization is mainly achieved through to 
isolating requirements into smaller independent units. The procurement process may be 
categorized as follows [40]: 
1. Gathering Information  
The first step is to gather information about the existing ICT infrastructure needs, 
available assets and resources, and end user requirements.  
An inventory of all of existing ICT systems hardware and software and frequency 
licenses is necessary to procure new systems. The inventory should include as many of 
the following as possible: quantity, manufacturer, make, and model, year of 
installation/purchase, year last upgraded, frequency of use, purpose, location, owner, 
user, original cost, and estimated remaining useful life. 
2. Capabilities Forecast  
Capabilities analysis of the new system is to identify if there are new capabilities 
to be added to the existing system and who will use them. 
Important capabilities to be required in the new system: backward compatibility 
with existing technology, compliance with operational; functional; and technical 
standards, ability to accommodate peak usage needs, and end-user support for equipment 
that includes handheld portable radios and vehicle-mounted mobile radios. 
3. Cost Prediction 
Price and value concepts are different from each other. The purchase price of the 
equipment or service alone is not sufficient to understand how much a system will cost 
over a 15-year period. Total Life Cycle Costs (TLCCs) is an important concept to take 
into consideration.  TLCC is a way to measure how much the system will cost over its 
expected life.  
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Value is a better concept which includes: purchase price, quality, warranties, and 
cost of the following: maintenance, training, service, along with hidden costs such as 
response time, reliability, company stability, delivery time, and contract terms and 
conditions.  
4. Joint Effort to Fund Communications Infrastructure 
The government should encourage this type of joint procurement between 
agencies which will enhance interoperability and reduce prices due the economy of scale 
principle.  
5. Identifying the Project’s Benefits  
It is important to justify the new ICT project by identifying its tangible benefits 
(decreased maintenance costs of old systems, improved coverage of service, and 
interoperability) and the intangible benefits (better morale, better customer service).  
6. Gap Analysis 
When the needs assessment is accomplished, a comprehensive gap analysis of the 
communications infrastructure should list what technologies may be able to meet the 
operational requirements of the agency. The next step is the draft of Request for Proposal 
(RFP). 
7. Request for Quotation (RFQ) and/or a Request for Proposal (RFP) 
Vendors respond to the RFQ with a bid or to the RFP with a proposal. RFP 
process should be started based on vendor neutral user requirements. 
The RFP should include the description of the following: Problems, Environment, 
(e.g., existing equipment, operational procedures, agency standards, and constraints), 
project outcome, scope (i.e., user functionality, system response times, delivery schedule, 
service levels, and training).  
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8. Proposal Evaluations 
An evaluation criterion should be defined before the reception of proposals. 
Proposals should be evaluated against that criterion to select the proposal that best meets 
the defined needs and requirements.  
9. Vendor Selection  
When a single vendor emerges from the evaluation criterion, contract negotiation 
is the next step. If more than one vendor succeeds, additional interviews are needed to 
select the best one.  
10. System Delivery  
The system should be delivered through a test plan. Factory Acceptance Test 
(FAT) and Field Acceptance Test (FIAT) are important to be conducted to make sure that 
the vendor’s design of system requirements complies with the user requirements. 
E.  CONSTRAINTS FACED BY EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS [44] 
The obstacles and problems facing communications in Jordan during disasters 
may be categorized into four types– institutional, regulatory, technical, and financial.  
There will be a strategy to deal with all of these constraints through the crafting of the 
emergency plan. 
1. Institutional Constraints  
A comprehensive disaster management format is needed especially in the context 
of immediate actions, long-term preparedness, and general disaster planning. Creating 
organizational structure for disaster management enables one to determine which 
agencies are more equipped to deal with emergencies. Better inter-agency coordination is 
also essential.  
2. Regulatory Constraints  
The lack of legislation for emergency management is the major regulatory 
constraint. Most of these constraints will be resolved when the pending National Crisis 
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Management Center (NCMC) starts its operations. The process of approval for 
communication equipment and systems still a lengthy one. Another issue is the heavy 
customs duties currently applicable to emergency/recovery shipments of communication 
equipment brought into the country. 
3. Technical Constraints  
The major technical concern is the limitation of resources for training and for 
retaining qualified communication personnel. Jordan’s general communications 
infrastructure may not be able to readily support the sudden amount of calls in case of a 
disaster. As in the aftermath of a major disaster, human emotional spontaneous action 
will be to call their loved ones.  
Other technical issues are expected to occur, such as radio communication 
frequency interference, lack of hotlines and radio links for disaster relief personnel, and 
lack of communication materials and equipment in case of emergency. 
4. Financial Constraints  
It is common to suffer lack of funds for emergency management as most agencies 
will not prioritize fund for something that has not happened yet. Different management 
parties may allocate different amounts to disaster communication and as such continuity 
and integrity of emergency services may be compromised. 
F. EFFECT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACK ON NEW YORK’S ICT 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
The infamous September 11 attacks provided the U.S. agencies experience 
resulting in an opportunity for other countries to study and learn. Many agencies and 
working groups studied the effects of the destruction on the ICT infrastructure. 
1. The Communications Infrastructure [9] 
The “Lower Manhattan Communication Users’ Working Group” issued a report 
in summer 2002 that contained findings and recommendations for building a 21st 
Century Communication Infrastructure.  
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Many of these findings are relevant to the Jordan ICT environment; the report 
gives a good understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities associated with resilience. 
The following findings are good to focus on: 
1st Finding 
“Communications outages after the attacks were a result of an under-
appreciation of potential failure points rather than a deficient infrastructure.”  
2nd Finding   
“Local exchange redundancy was not offered as a standard service.”  
3rd Finding  
“Carrier redundancy does not necessarily mean true redundancy.” 
4th Finding  
“The ‘last mile’ (between local exchange and customer premises) is the 
key to the resilience of business communications network.”  
5th Finding  
“Property owners and building landlords play a key role in providing 
communications reliability.”  
The “Lower Manhattan Communication Users’ Working Group” is a telecom 
industry group which is mainly a Circuit-Switching (CS) technology. Over-centralization 
causes major disruption in Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). In the World Trade 
Center (WTC), three central offices were destroyed which disrupted the service as 
expected.  
BellSouth Phone Company (as an example) reported a three-fold increase in 
traffic that morning, so phone lines were busy for both cell phones and landlines.  
2. The Internet Infrastructure [45] 
Tuesday 9/11 2001 was the first real test of the Internet from different 
perspectives. During and after the event, the Internet proved itself as a vital means of 
communications. People could not reach anyone on their home phone, cell phone, or 
work phone, so E-mail ended up being the a successful option. 
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According to Keynote Systems Inc., an Internet performance measurement 
company, the Internet’s central backbone performed well overall. The Internet showed 
better resilience, as in the hours following the attack, Internet traffic slowed the major 
news web sites, and web masters solved that problem by disabling video streaming and 
graphics from their sites to allow users to access the news faster. Normally, CNN.com 
gets 14 million page views per day, that morning it reached 9 million page views per 
hour. ABC news took measures including borrowing server capacity from a sister 
company at ESPN.com. 
Most of the Internet infrastructure, even in lower Manhattan, continued to 
function normally for two reasons: First, Internet infrastructure is decentralized with no 
single point of failure. Second, most of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) infrastructure in 
Manhattan was not within the disaster footprint, which allowed New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) to reopen the following week. 
G. SUMMARY 
The main goal of this chapter was to explore the U.S. experience in disaster 
management and interoperability for emergency plan enhancement in Jordan. The main 
point to take out of the U.S. experience is not to fall into the same mistakes and 
confusions.  
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IV. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY 
PLAN REQUIREMENTS SURVEY 
The resilience of communications infrastructure is vital to the well-being of any 
country; however, 100% resilience is impossible. Risk management for the probability of 
communication failure required and appropriate measures to ensure that communication 
systems are robust and available in case of emergency are always difficult to achieve.  
In this chapter, the requirements for the emergency communications 
interoperability plan are surveyed. To prepare for the disaster, a thorough analysis of the 
communications infrastructure is required to determine the weaknesses and strengths and 
feed this information into an asset database which will be used for planning.  Single 
points of failure should be identified and resolved in a timely manner.  
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR A PUBLIC SAFETY NETWORK  
The First Responders Community (FRC) is used to having its own non-
commercial ICT networks in which they do not compete with other users, have priority 
access, and good security. The requirements for a viable emergency communication 
interoperability plan could be outlined in accordance with certain headlines: Availability 
of the infrastructure, security, Quality of Control (QoS), and the ability to reach to mobile 
platforms. In the following discussions, the approach for the communication 
infrastructure study is presented. 
1. Availability oA  [1] 
Availability identifies if the service provider will be able to offer communications 
continuously in a given area. There are three principles of high availability engineering: 
Elimination of single points of failure, reliable crossover, and swift detection of failures.  
Availability depends on the type of service and the service provider. Availability 
engineering is needed to create a reliable system and infrastructure. Availability refers to 
how much time the system takes to be fixed and is up and running again.  
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In contrast, reliability refers to whether or not the infrastructure is working, and 
capability is the sum of services provided for the First Responders Community (FRC), 
and scalability refers to how well the system handles surge conditions, whereas 
survivability measures the resistance of the system to failure, and finally, there is 
restorability which is a measure of how easy the system is restored upon failure. 
To reduce frequency of failure alone will not increase availability. It should be 
accompanied by a reduction in the repair time. To design for availability, the system 
should predict, detect, and resolve the failure (software or hardware) before the system 
halts, thereby minimizing downtime. 
Network availability is vital for the successful accomplishment of various people 
working in their tasks. Failure of the network stops the overall operation and is not 
acceptable. Building networks with high availability is feasible using Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) technology which makes it easier and cheaper for the implementation 





                                                                 (1.1) 
Networks are comprised of components with different availability characteristics 
connected together. Figure 6 shows an example of a typical network which shows how 







Figure 6.   Availability calculation example without redundancy (After: [1]). 
  
As shown in Figure 6, oA is assumed as 99.7% for Wide Area Network (WAN), 
99.9% for the router, and 99% for LAN and end systems collectively. Since these 
components are connected in a series, oA total is the product of the oA  for the three 
components: 
 0.997 0.999 0.99 0.986oA = × × =  
For a 30-day month, there are30 days 24 hours 60 minutes= 43200 minutes× × , 
thus the down time is calculated to be 605 minutes.  This is a considerably long down 
time per month. Redundancy is the best technique to solve this problem   High 
availability requires that a single point of failure be resolved, providing that reliable 




Figure 7.   Availability calculation example with redundancy (After: [1]). 
 
In this configuration, 0.999889  5 minutes down timeoA = = , which is a big 
improvement toward high availability of the system. 
The importance of these values depends on the mission of the system. In the case 
of mission critical systems, such as 9-1-1 emergency systems, the extra cost of building a 
redundant system is justified.  A comparison of typically used percentages is shown in 
Table 2 below. 
It is important to know that this is not just an emergency services exercise. The 
infrastructure which is built for emergency services is (and should be) used by day-to-day 
government personnel including their ability to reach the public. Emergency services 
properly represent the most demanding requirements for the Internet infrastructure. An 
example of this could be for the schools to be the backbone of the network in case of 
emergency. 
A robust infrastructure meets the three principles of high oA  engineering: 
elimination of single points of failure as shown above, redundancy through the 





Table 2.   Comparison of System Availability Data (From: [8]). 
 
The requirements for commercial network availability are not so high, and 
interruption is not a surprise. Mobile networks enhance the availability of the system by 
doubling the number of critical components and equip the switches and the base stations 
with extra batteries.  
2. Quality of Service (QoS) vs. Quality of Service (qos) [1] 
Quality of Service (QoS) is the quality of service control of configuration to 
optimize other features. Congestion in the network leads to a requirement to control QoS. 
Technologies vary regarding the ability to control QoS: WiMAX has the ability to control 
QoS; while WiFi does not have any significant ability to control QoS. In the wired part of 
the Internet, implementation of QoS measures is avoided by over provisioning.  
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) defines quality of service (qos) 
(lower case notation) for the qos in the context of how it was experienced.  To measure 
qos there are some factor such as Bandwidth efficiency (throughput), determinism, 
latency, jitter, and interactivity. Throughput is measured by packet per second; while 
latency is the time is taken for a packet to get through a network. Jitter is the time of 
delivery of packets from a source to a receiving system. These factors are dependant on 
each others. An example for this concept is that WiFi and WiMAX qos behavior (at layer 
2) are as shown in Table 3.  
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 WiFi WiMAX 
Bandwidth efficiency Contention MAC (CSMA).  
This means that bandwidth 
efficiency is very low 
(about 20% of the baseband 
capacity of the channel). 
Non-contention MAC. This 
means that bandwidth 
efficiency is very good 
(about 90% of the baseband 
capacity of the channel).  
Determinism There is no determinism.  
There is a probability that 
the packet will get accepted, 
but no tight assurance and 
no assurance within a 
bounded time window. 
Determinism is good. Once 
an SS is in the network, it is 
assured a transmit window 
within a finite amount of 
time. 
Latency Good latency only in a 
lightly loaded network.   
Latency and interactivity 
are traded off. 
Jitter Good latency only in a 
lightly loaded network.   
Good jitter as it is based on 
determinism. 
Interactivity Good latency only in a 
lightly loaded network.   
Latency and interactivity 
are traded off. 
Table 3.   WiFi and WiMAX qos behavior (From: [1]). 
 
 
3. Security and Privacy 
Security is categorized into two parts: content protection and infrastructure 
protection. Content protection includes authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and non-
repudiation quartet.  
Infrastructure protection includes resistance to Denial of Service (DOS) and Type 
of Service (TOS) attacks, resistance to Threat Analysis (TA) /Two Factor Authentication 
(computer security authentication) analysis, Low Probability Intercept (LPI), and 
Transmission security (TRANSEC) issues.  It is a common mistake to attempt to use 
remedies targeted at infrastructure protection problems at the content protection problem 
[1]. 
The network should offer high level of identification and authentication for users 




necessary to enhance privacy. Compromise is necessary between security measures for 
public safety network and accessibility so that it will be closed for the public in case of 
emergency. 
If the First Responders Community (FRC) is to share an open commercial 
network with other users, they should enjoy the same security as they have in current 
private networks. Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) networks do not include end-to-end 
encryption, GSM telephones that are safe from eavesdropping have been launched, but 
they are expensive. 
B. NETWORK ATTRIBUTES 
1. Coverage 
Coverage identifies whether users can use the wireless network in a particular 
area. Typically, service providers focus on coverage in high population area, which 
means that rural areas may not have full coverage. Some factors may affect the coverage 
level: power of transmission, structures and obstacles in the area, and the frequency used.  
The First Responders Community (FRC) requires coverage of all of the 
geographical areas of the country.  GSM networks usually do not have coverage outside 
populated areas due to its user-based business model. GSM coverage in Jordan is 
estimated to be around 65% [46]. 
2. Accessibility 
Accessibility is how readily users can access and utilize the wireless network. 
Accessibility is important during peak hours and network disruption as those 
circumstances coincide with disasters and emergencies.  
It is vital to make government infrastructure services more accessible to citizens 
and other clients. A key is to leverage services between country agencies, central and 
local government and to promote inter-agency and inter-governmental data sharing [7]. 
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3. Transmission Speed 
The transmission speed is defined as the rate at which data is transmitted through 
the network. There are factors that affect the rate of transmission such as error correction 
technique used, level of traffic on the network, and bottlenecks between components of 
the network [7]. 
4. Fast Call Setup 
Fast call setup is the time that the system needs to put on a call and is important, 
especially in the case of emergencies. 
The First Responders Community (FRC) requires a call setup of below 1 second 
with call length of several seconds. GSM is intended for commercial use with users 
having a different usage profile where a call setup is about 3 seconds with call length of 
several minutes [20]. 
Reducing the call setup time requires important changes in the commercial mobile 
network switches. If the backbone is based on Packet-Switching technology and the 
network is using routers, call setup requires milliseconds only. 
Another way to solve the problem would be keeping the channels open on a 
permanent basis within a cell in case of emergency, which would require an enormous 
extra capacity. 
5. Network Capacity 
It is essential to have sufficient capacity, especially in the case of an emergency. 
The commercial mobile networks have not been built for many simultaneous calls within 
a limited geographical area (in case of Circuit-Switching (CS) infrastructure) [7]. 
6. Direct Local Communication  
The users within a limited area must be able to talk to each other, even if the 
network is temporarily out of order. In commercial mobile networks, the calls are 
directed through the network and cannot be done directly.  
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The TETRA-handsets are designed to communicate with each other within a 
limited geographical area, even if the network does not function (direct mode operation). 
WiFi and WiMAX have this feature as these network architecture types could 
enable users to talk to each other locally. Satellite phones do not have this feature as the 
phones are connected directly to the satellite network [13]. 
7. Group Communication (Multicast) 
The First Responders Community (FRC) tends to talk simultaneously. All users 
have to be informed all the time (without having to think about whether certain user has 
been notified). GSM supports broadcast, but not flexible group calling [13]. 
8. Control Room Solution 
The First Responders Community (FRC) has a requirement working in an 
operation control room where these FRC members work in well-equipped control rooms 
to control large groups of rescue personnel in the field. Commercial mobile networks do 
not support this way of working [7]. 
9.  Addressing Functionality 
Addressing functionality is defined as the way by which a specific service is 
accessed; voice services may be accessed in two ways: Push-To Talk (PTT) and touch-
tone dialing. FRC members are used to PTT systems [13]. 
10. Cost  
The cost for any system includes its primary cost, the running cost and longer 
term life cycle (replacement) costs. Affordability of the system is important for the level 
of its spread and usage.  Procurement of new equipment should be decided with respect 
to the running cost and the salvage value for the systems in service. The decision for the 
specific infrastructure technology procurement should be made at a high level to lessen 
the risk that many agencies may procure non-interoperable systems.  
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11. Mobility 
Mobility is a crucial attribute for an emergency response mission. First 
Responders Community (FRC) members will set up temporary field facilities that require 
communications and other logistics support. In this case, the easiest way to furnish 
communication solutions would be wireless connections. While WiFi may be used to 
connect locally, WiMAX is fit for long haul point to point or point to multi-point 
purposes. 
WiMAX (terrestrial bridging) technology is characterized by swift deployment in 
harsh conditions to provide reliable voice, video, and data communications for wider 
distances than other terrestrial wireless technologies [1]. 
Response to emergency situations is on two levels, local and non-local. Local 
authorities and groups should have the assets, awareness, and training to react instantly to 
the emergency. Non-local agencies mean countrywide, private sector, and sometimes 
those of international domain [13]. 
C. INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS 
A public safety response to emergencies is based on ICT services. Interoperability 
is defined as the ability of different agencies to work together which include PTT radios, 
trunking, and other wireless or radio systems. Capabilities and assets are combined in 
harmony to reach this goal.  
Procurements according to specific interoperability standards builds an 
interoperable communications network. Currently, communications networks should be 
routable to be interoperable with each other. There are four communications types 
needed; each one needs an appropriate amount of attention [1]: 
1. Government-Government Communications Needs   
Fire departments, as an example, need to talk to each other across jurisdictions 
and to police departments.  An effective dispatching, resilient hardware solution set, and 
common language are needed. 
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2. Citizen-Government Communications Needs   
Citizens are a valuable source of information to the government. This relationship 
could be enhanced by promoting public awareness about the importance of their feedback 
and contributions. 
 3. Citizen-Citizen Communications Needs   
This communications need between citizens was evident in many emergencies 
such as the December 2004 Southeast Asia tsunami. Another clear example for this need 
is when a bridge collapsed in the U.S. The I-35 Bridge collapsed in Minneapolis, Mn, 
USA in the summer of 2007. The collapse was during rush hour, which caused a large 
missing-persons list and overwhelmed the regions emergency services agencies and 
personnel. The list was suppressed using the citywide WiFi network which was opened to 
the public and “I am OK” messages between citizens were transmitted [1]. 
4. Government/Military-NGO Community Communications Needs   
This is specifically true for major international disasters that multiple nations 
respond to (i.e., Pakistan earthquake). Collaboration and cooperation is enhanced when 
communications interoperability is better. 
D. SUMMARY 
Interoperability is vital for First Responders Community (FRC) members on the 
ground to be able to talk to each other. Currently, many solutions are flooding the market 
to try to address myriad problems that arose out of these past disasters and incidents. 
Power is the core of any system to work in this harsh environment with the assumption 
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V. COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, overviews for most of the communications technologies standards 
currently available are introduced. This background is needed to furnish an emergency 
communication interoperability plan.   
Communications technology standards can be generic, open, or proprietary. 
Generic standards define independent objectives for equipment functions. It allows a 
design to be either open or proprietary. Open standards use a collaborative methodology 
which makes system components interchangeable by another vendor. Open standards 
lead to lower prices, better interoperability, and better performance due to competition. 
Proprietary standards are often controlled by a specific vendor which promotes a 
monopoly of their particular solutions and could lead to higher prices than are necessary 
[13]. 
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) technology allows replacing proprietary 
network equipment. COTS technology advantages are availability, the ability to introduce 
new applications in less time at lowered costs, and system interoperability. 
A.  WIRELINE VS. WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS MEDIUM  
1. Wireline Communications Medium 
Wireline communications mediums include copper, coaxial cable, and optical 
fiber. These wireline communications mediums could be using a Circuit-Switching 
technology or a Packet-Switching technology.  
These wireline communications mediums have advantages such as security, 
availability, and reliability. Disadvantages for these mediums are the high installation 
cost, susceptibility to disasters (floods, earthquakes), and lack of flexibility.     
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2. Wireless Communications Medium 
Wireless and radio communications medium refers to the radio frequency (RF) 
spectrum. Many technologies utilize this medium such as: Satellite, radio & television 
broadcasting, computer networks, cellular, and Specialized Mobile Radio Technologies 
[30].  
The First Responders Community (FRC) has been the pioneer for the use of 
wireless data capabilities. Wireless technologies are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Wireless Standards (From: [30]). 
 
Wireless systems are the essence of mobility which is necessary for public safety 
applications. These systems provide the required reliability, availability, accessibility, 
control, security, and functionality to meet the emergency and tactical communication 
needs of First Responders Community (FRC). Table 4 depicts the characteristics of 





Functional Requirement Wireless Systems Characteristics 
Sufficient coverage to support 
component missions 
Provide coverage in areas of public safety operations 
Provides in-building coverage 
Sufficient availability to support 
public safety operations 
Wireless systems capacity for availability during 
emergency conditions 
Reliable services to ensure 
support to components missions 
Wireless systems provide the reliability and 
responsiveness needed public safety operations 
Ease of addressing and instant 
communications 
Provides instantaneous push-to-talk functionality 
Hands-free operations Provides hands-free functionality for public safety 
requirements 
Components for control critical 
assets 
Provides public safety agencies control of assets, 
including Over-The –Air Rekeying (OTAR) and Over –
The-Air management (OTAM) 
Security of communications and 
operations 
Provide high level of security 
Non-dependency on commercial 
assets 
Ensure non-dependency on commercial assets that may 
be vulnerable to attack (physical and electronic) 
Table 4.   Wireless Systems Characteristics (After: [21]). 
 
B. CIRCUIT-SWITCHING TECHNOLOGIES OVERVIEW 
Circuit-Switching (CS) technologies are still in use even if efforts are continuing 
toward transforming to Packet-Switching (PS) technologies and applications. The 
following is an overview of the most important Circuit-switching technologies: 
1. Satellite Technology  
Satellite technology plays a vital role in all human life aspects. There are three 
popular satellite orbits [19]: 
a. Low Earth Orbit (LEO)  
LEO orbit is located at 1,250 miles above earth and it takes the satellite 
90-120 minutes to rotate around earth. 
b. Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)   
MEO orbit is located at 6,250 miles above earth and it takes the satellite 6 
hours to rotate around earth. 
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c. Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)  
GEO orbit is located at 22,282 miles above earth and it takes the satellite 
24 hours to rotate around earth. 
Mobile satellite services are useful for the First Responders Community 
(FRC) as it can connect them almost anytime and anywhere on the globe. Satellite 
technology is not as vulnerable to physical damage as other types of networks - making it 
relatively more reliable than other technologies. Figure 9 depicts typical satellite 






Figure 9.   Satellite Solutions for emergency communications (From: [5]). 
 
Most mobile telephone networks operate close to capacity during normal 
times. Large spikes in call volumes caused by widespread emergencies often overload the 
system just when it is needed the most. Examples reported in the media such as: the 
attacks of 9/11/2001, the December 2004 Southeast Asia tsunami, the 2003 Northeast 
(U.S.) utility grid power blackouts, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2007 Minnesota bridge 
collapse. 
Also, terrestrial cell antennas and networks are vulnerable to natural 
disasters. Satellite telephony can usually avoid this problem in communications during 
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natural disaster. Satellite phones usage is popular for expeditions into remote areas where 
terrestrial cellular service is unavailable. Following are common technologies in this 
domain: 
2.  Satellite Vendors 
a. Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN) 
BGAN is an L Band satellite Internet and telephony network provided by 
INMARSAT. The system uses two geostationary satellites; with a third satellite launched 
in August 2008 and expected to be in service in early 2009. The system will then cover 
all parts of the world except for the highest portions of the Polar Regions. 
The advantage of BGAN over other satellite systems is that the terminal is 
portable, easy to use, and has high of quality and speed for both voice and data services. 
The system utilizes the L band, which is more resistant to rain fade than most other 
satellite frequencies.  
b. Thuraya [47] 
Thuraya (the Arabic name for the Pleiades) is a regional satellite phone 
provider. Its coverage area extends to most of Europe, the Middle East, North, Central 
and East Africa, Asia and Australia. 
The company is based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and distributes 
its products and services world wide through authorized service providers. The current 
number of subscribers in the network is around 250,000 (March 2006).  
The system offers voice communications with handheld or fixed terminals, 
Short Message Service (SMS), and 9.6 Kbit/s of data & fax service. GPS is supported by 
all handsets. 
c. Iridium [48] 
The Iridium satellite system is a constellation of 66 active communication 
satellites with spares in orbit and on the ground. It allows worldwide voice and data 
communications using handheld satellite phones. 
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The Iridium network is unique in that it coverage extends to the whole 
earth, including poles, oceans and airways. The company claims to have 285,000 
subscribers (August 2008).  
Despite the bandwidth limitations, transparent IP is supported. Iridium 
claims data rates up to 10 kilobits per second (kbps) for their "direct Internet" service.  
An evaluation of this technology for emergency communications could be 
derived. It proves that it is currently the most reliable and dominant in the field of 
emergency relief and response, especially in the international domain. Satellite 
communications technologies in general are Hastily Formed Network (HFN) enabled, 
mobile and usage flexibility is one of its strongest attributes.  
2. Mobile Telephony  
Throughout all other technologies, the merging of mobile telephony and the 
Internet were the two biggest successes. Currently, mobile handsets in some countries are 
more than fixed phone lines. Following an overview of the mobile telephony evolution 
[35]:     
a. The First Generation (1G) 
The first generation (1G) of mobile telephony used analogue 
communications such as the following standards: The first cellular network standard 
Advanced Mobile Phone System (AMPS), Total Access Communication System (TACS) 
is the European version of the AMPS standard, and Extended Total Access 
Communication System (ETACS), which is an enhancement of the TACS standard. 





Figure 10.   The mobile technology evolution (From:  [20]). 
 
b. The Second Generation (2G)  
The second generation (2G) of mobile networks switched from analogue 
to digital communications, the following standards are examples: Global System for 
Mobile communications (GSM) or Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM), Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA), and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA). 
2G was enhanced to 2.5G as General Packet Radio System (GPRS) 
standard and 2,75G as the Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution (EDGE) standard.  
GSM is discussed in more detail in the following section as it is the most 
successful standard in mobile telephony.  
(1) Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) 
In 1982, the Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs (CEPT) 
formed a study group called the Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) to develop a mobile 
telephone system.  
The European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) took over 
the project and published the first specification in 1990. While data services are available, 
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typically at 9.6 kbps the primary use of GSM is for voice. GSM cells are limited to 
approximately 35km diameter. GSM is the dominant cellular technology worldwide [46]. 
In circuit-switched systems, QoS is binary (either the call gets through or 
not), but when overloaded, the system will be jammed and no services are offered which 
was a big flaw [1]. 
Coverage and availability are almost tied together but sometimes a call 
cannot be completed in a service area due to the lack of capacity of the network. Other 
factors that can limit availability include the level of area priority, Radio Frequency (RF), 
and terrain characteristics. 
GSM network call dropouts are often due to power loss in the area and 
handover failure. Transmission quality measurements start once the call is established 
which includes low voice volume, level of noise, echo, crosstalk, and garbling (breaking-
up). Post Dial Delay (PDD) is the time the GSM network takes to initiate a call. Mainly, 
this factor depends on how fast the network is able to route a call. 
GSM Quality of Service (QoS) is based on call procedures and voice 
criteria as data is still limited on GSM network. The parameters which could be tested in 
context of QoS are coverage, availability, call dropouts, transmission quality, and Post 
Dial Delay (PDD).  
In emergency response, a mobile network cell can be installed on location 
and cell phones can quickly be disseminated to users. A satellite link is used as a back 
haul and may be used in international deployment for First Responders Community 
(FRC) members. The services of cellular technology will be useful for the users, which 
are not available in other solutions such as messaging, multimedia sharing, and location. 
The evaluation for cell technologies is based on the fact that it is not based 
on a routable network. The case should be made that those new technologies using 
cellular infrastructure with IP based applications are evolving [1]. Table 5 shows the 
typical attributes for mobile telephony standards. 
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2G GSM Transfer voice, or low-volume data 
9.6  9.6  
2.5G GPRS Transfer voice, or moderate-volume data 
21.4-171.2 48  
2.75G EDGE Simultaneous transfer voice & data 
43.2-345.6 171  
3G UMTS Simultaneous transfer voice& high-speed 
data 144-2000 384  
Table 5.   Mobile Telephony Standards (From:  [35]). 
 
c. The Third Generation (3G) [49] 
Third generation offers a set of new technologies that offers true mobile, 
broadband data: video on demand, videophones, broadband gaming, real-time audio, and 
other broadband services. 3G standard are Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
(UMTS), and High-Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) sometimes categorized as 
3.5G.  
d. The Fourth Generation (4G) 
Fourth generation (4G) is the future of cellular technology which looks 
promising in the context of interoperability. The first generation (1G) and second 
generation (2G) systems were mainly designed for voice telephony transmission. The 
third generation (3G) is for both voice and data transmission but still not routable 
network and it is point-to-point [1].  
The fourth generation (4G) is still in the planning stages and needs more 
years to be fully deployed. The expected timeframe for full 4G implementation is about 
2012-2015 where systems should be interoperable with existing wireless standards.  
While 3G systems are based on two infrastructures in parallel consisting 
of Circuit-Switching and Packet-Switching network nodes, the target for the 4G systems  
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is an IP, packet switched network solution where voice, data and streamed multimedia 
are available "Anytime, Anywhere" for users along with higher data rates than previous 
generations. 
In 4G systems, Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) support is essential in 
order to furnish service for a large number of wireless-enabled devices. IPv6 also enables 
a number of applications with better multicast, security, and route optimization 
capabilities. 
The technologies which are being considered as pre-4G are the following:  
  (1) Fast Low-latency Access with Seamless Handoff Orthogonal 
Frequency Division Multiplexing (Flash-OFDM) which is also referred to as F-OFDM, is 
a system that has generated interest as a packet-switched cellular bearer [50]. 
(2) WiMAX. Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
(WiMAX) forum is a non-profit industry organization formed to emphasize the adoption 
of this technology to assure interoperability between different vendors’ products. 
(3) WiBro (Wireless Broadband) is the South Korean service name for 
the IEEE 802.16e (mobile WiMAX) international standard [34]. 
(4) iBurst or High Capacity Spatial Division Multiple Access (HC-
SDMA) is a wireless broadband technology that optimizes the use of its bandwidth with 
the help of smart antennas [49]. 
(5) 3GPP2 Ultra Mobile Broadband (UMB) was the brand name for a 
project within 3GPP2 to improve the CDMA2000 mobile phone standard for next 
generation applications and requirements [51]. 
(6) The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) started the Long 
Term Evolution (LTE) project to improve the Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System (UMTS) mobile phone standard to cope with future technology evolutions. Goals 
include improving spectral efficiency, lowering costs, improving services. While 3GPP 
Release 8 has yet to be ratified as a standard, much of the standard will be oriented 
around upgrading UMTS to a 4G mobile communications technology [49]. 
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A large amount of the work is aimed at simplifying the architecture of the 
system, as it transits from the existing UMTS circuit & packet switching combined 
network, to an all-IP flat architecture system. 
The main benefit of 4G systems for public safety communications is 
interoperability as it will seamlessly hand-off the user from one network to another even 
with different frequencies and technologies.  
3. Land Mobile Radio Systems (LMRS) Standards [36] 
Land Mobile Radio Systems (LMRS) standards include public safety and 
specialized mobile radio technologies standards which are designed for public safety 
communications.  
These communications standards could be open or vendor-proprietary. The 
following standards are considered as open: TETRA of European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI), TETRAPOL (TETRAPOL Forum). The following standards 
are considered as proprietary: iDEN of Motorola, EDACS of Ericsson.  
Trunking is characterized by having a controller in the network that maps and 
assigns calls to channels. Conventional systems repeat radio calls from one frequency to 
another. To accommodate a very large number of subscribers, trunked radio systems 
typically allocate more frequency pairs (channels). 
Trunked radio system is a radio topology intended to create an efficient frequency 
spectrum network. One of the advantages for trunked radio systems is that each agency 
can separate its communications by having a talk group. Another advantage to a trunked 
system is the increased immunity against eavesdropping as the system switches channels 
many times during a communications session. The main disadvantage of the trunked 
system is the complexity of the infrastructure.  
Figure 11 depicts the evolution of public safety radio standards. The figure shows 





Figure 11.   Evolution of Public Safety Radio Standards (After: [36]). 
 
The Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International (APCO) 
started several projects toward trunking technology standardization. APCO Project-16 
(P16) is a project that was developed in the 1970s as a standard for analog trunked radio 
systems. This standard was adopted by public safety agencies and industrial users. 
APCO and National Association of State Telecommunications Directors 
(NASTD) started P25 in 1989 as a result of P16 incompatibility. The aim of the project 
was a standard which would provide interoperable emergency communications.  
Project 34 (P34) is a EIA/TIA standardized system for provision of packet data 
services in an interoperable dispatch oriented topology for public safety service providers 
In this thesis, TETRA & iDEN are discussed in detail as they are already installed 
in Jordan. The GSM Trunking System (GSMT) is also elaborated upon as an 
interoperability technological solution: 
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a. Integrated Digital Enhanced Network (iDEN/Motorola) 
iDEN is a Motorola proprietary standard for mobile phone system (push-
to-talk radio dispatch messaging, and data communication). It is based on TDMA 
technology with (800) MHZ frequency band (1.5 GHZ in Japan) [23]. 
 
Figure 12.   iDEN System Services (From:  [26]). 
 
b. Terrestrial Trunked Radio System (TETRA)  
TETRA is sometimes called Trans-European Trunked Radio System 
(TETRA). This standard was defined by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) for the Private Mobile Radio (PMR). Public safety and emergency 
services are embedded in the core design of this technology as it offers bandwidth-on-
demand, unlimited group size, priority calls, call pre-emption, and all-informed 
communications [24]. 
The first agencies to implement TETRA were the European public safety 
and emergency services (Police, Medics, and other related groups). A comparison 
between Private Mobile Radio (PMR) and Public Communication Network (PCN) is 
elaborated upon in Table 6. 
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Low to Medium Medium 
Call 
Setup 
Fast push-to-talk of 300 msec Interconnection time about 5 msec 
Call 
Duration 
About 20 Sec, High Frequency 2 Minutes 
Call 
Profile 
90% made within same region, 60% 
initiated by control dispatcher 
85% made via PSTN, 5% mobile to 
mobile in different region and 10%  
mobile to mobile in same region 
Table 6.   Differences Between PMR and PCN (After:  [38]). 
 
TETRA is a Time Division Multiplexing Access (TDMA) narrowband 
system (25 KHz) using 4-slot TDMA to provide digital voice and data services for up to 
4 simultaneous users. The main difference between TETRA and GSM is the usage scope. 
TETRA is designed for professional applications while GSM is designed for public 


























5-40 FDM 25KHz 45KHz 800/900 MHz 
Table 7.   TETRA vs. iDEN Comparison (After:  [24]).  
 
When the trunked radio is built, it is vital to assure First Responders 
Community (FRC) members’ connectivity to a citizen on any other network such as the 
Internet. The GSM interconnection to this closed network may be facilitated using GSMT 
technology discussed below. On the other hand, WiMAX and WiFi may be used to 
connect LANs infrastructure to the nation-wide infrastructure.  
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c. GSM Trunking System (GSMT) [38] 
GSMT supports all standard GSM services in addition to trunking services 
as shown in Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13.   GSMT Evolution (From: [38]). 
 
GSM has a little performance degradation due to more nodes and signal 
procedure complexity. As GSM is cost effective, some operators in Europe are 
cooperating with governments for trunking over GSM. GSMT aims to maximize service 
availability, efficiency, security, and dispatching convenience.  
 
 iDEN/TETRA GSMT 
Performance High Performance 
Call Setup time less than 500 ms 
PTT time less that 300 ms 
Similar performance 
Call setup time less than 1 s 
PTT time less than 300 ms 
Service Trunking service+ poor data 
service 
 
Trunking service+ All GSM 
service 
 
Cost High cost Cost effective 
standard Private To be standardized 
Roaming No Yes 
Evolution Limited To 3G (dual mode) 
Table 8.   TETRA/iDEN vs. GSMT Comparison (After:  [38]). 
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C. PACKET-SWITCHING TECHNOLOGIES OVERVIEW 
There are several Packet-Switching technologies in use, but the following is an 
overview of the relevant ones to this thesis: 
1. Satellite Technology: Satellite Internet Access 
Due to it high cost, usually, users choose satellite technology solutions due to 
unavailability of other cheaper services. Other reasons may be that local infrastructure is 
very expensive. There are two main types of Satellite Internet service: two-way and one-
way.  
Two-way satellite Internet service includes sending and receiving data from the 
remote Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) site via satellite to a hub. The hub then 
relays data through the Internet. The satellite dish at each location must be precisely 
pointed to avoid interference with other satellites.  
Almost all VSAT systems are IP-based technology, with diverse applications. 
Data rates typically range from narrowband up to 4 Mbit/s [54]. 
2. IEEE 802.11 Standard  
The IEEE 802.11 based suite of standards is for Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLAN). The IEEE 802.11 standard was ratified by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in 1997, which provides data rates of 1 Mbps and 2 Mbps 
[14]. 
The Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) term was originated with Wireless Ethernet 
Compatibility Alliance (WECA), an organization standardizing the development and 





Figure 14.   802.11 Frequency Spectrum (From:  [17]). 
 
Normally, a WiFi network includes an Access Point (AP) and wireless clients 
connect through it. The AP beacons its Service Set Identifier, Network (SSID) name 
every 100ms.  
Advantages of WiFi are: uses unlicensed radio spectrum, allows easy LAN 
deployment, reduced cost as it does not use cables, and supports various degrees of 
encryption to protect traffic from interception. 
The disadvantages of WiFi are: Limited level of mobility, vulnerable to 
interference, designed technically for short-range operations and it is basically an indoors 
technology, and there are still security issues to be addressed [17]. 
WiFi uses Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), also known as Shared Key 
Authentication, as an optional security measure. WEP was developed to protect the 
wireless.   
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Newer security standards for WiFi were introduced in response to several serious 
weaknesses found in WEP such as: WiFi Protected Access (WPA) which use better 
security protocol named Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP),  WiFi Protected 
Access 2 (WPA2) which uses Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher as a 
replacement for the Ron's Code 4 (RC4), WiFi Protected Access with Pres-shared key 
(WPA-PSK) and Robust Security Network (RSN) which uses AES Encryption [17]. 
An evaluation of WiFi technology for emergency communications could be 
derived. WiFi is Hastily Formed Network (HFN) enabled; ease of usage is a key feature. 
Its lack of security is normally not an issue here as it is often not a priority as access to 
the network in case of emergency is often deemed to be wide open.  
3. IEEE 802.16 Standard  
The 802.16 standard was specified by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE). Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is the 
industry association.  These entities overlap, but they are different (similar to IEEE 
802.11 and WiFi overlap) [1].   
The WiMAX forum is a non-profit industry organization formed to emphasize the 
adoption of this technology to assure interoperability between different vendors’ 
products. WiMAX Forum Certified™ signature on equipment means that it has been 
tested and shown to be following the standard. The user may procure from multiple 
vendors with no compatibility concerns. In this thesis, the WiMAX term will be used 
whenever possible. 
WiMAX can support two forms of wireless service: Non-Line Of Sight (Non-
LOS) form and Line Of Sight (LOS). Non-LOS works in the same manner as WiFi 
systems where an antenna on a computer connects to the WiMAX tower. It uses a lower 
frequency range (2 to 11 GHz) [2]. 
LOS uses a fixed, high antenna that must point straight at the WiMAX tower and 
match up with its antenna. LOS has better and robust performance. It uses higher 
frequencies — up to 66 GHz with coverage area of up to 30 miles in ideal conditions. 
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Due to the flexibility and high performance of WiMAX, on July 22, 2006, it was 
reported that the first deployment of a WiMAX multipoint network at sea of eleven off-
shore oil rig platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, USA. This network used 3.4 GHz WiMAX 
transmissions with double redundancy components and systems at all locations with span 
average of 10 Km [27].   
The following figure depicts WiMAX subscribers forecast until 2012. The figure 
shows that mobile WiMAX will be dominant in the future. 
 
Figure 15.   WiMAX Subscribers Forecast (From: [34]). 
 
a. Fixed-WiMAX 
802.16-2004 (often referred to as 802.16d) is designed to allow users to 
access the service from various locations covered by the network. Currently, as there are 
no portable devices, users can access the service only from their home location, where the 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) is installed. IEEE 802.16-2004 represents a turning 
point where compliant products started to appear. It uses selectable channel bandwidth 
from 1.25 to 20 MHz. Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) comprises of outdoor 
directional antenna and indoor modems.  
802.16-2004 is a cable replacement business model, where WiMAX 
equipment is used as a radio-WAN cloud with routers at the border. WiMAX can reach 
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mobile platforms and be a bridging backbone for WiFi systems. In remote areas without 
infrastructure, connecting using WiMAX technology is almost always cheaper than 
wireline technologies [1]. 
Mobility (m) version will be IEEE 802.16-2008 or IEEE 802.16-2009 
versions. Figure 16 depicts the evolution WiMAX standards. 
 
 
Figure 16.   WiMAX Evolutions (From:  [31]).  
 
b. Mobile-WiMAX 
802.16-2005 (often referred to as 802.16e) adds mobility to the WiMAX. 
Seamless handover and roaming is feasible when users are moving from cell to cell. 
Vendors planned WiMAX chips to be installed as PC data cards, mobile handsets and 
laptops. 802.16-2005 allows mobile wireless broadband access at vehicular speeds. 
Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) comprises of PC data cards, laptops, and mobile 
handsets with embedded WiMAX chips. 802.16-2005 is a cell phone replacement 
business model, where this model needs handoff technique labeled (mobility 




 802.16 802.16a 802.16-2004 802.16-2005 
Time Frame December 2001 January 2003 June 2004 December 2005 
Spectrum 10-66 GHz < 11 GHz < 11 GHz < 6 GHz 
Operation LOS Non-LOS Non-LOS Non-LOS and Mobile
Bit Rate 
 
32-134 Mbps Up to 75 Mbps Up to 75 Mbps Up to 15 Mbps 
Cell Radius 1-3 miles 3-5 miles 3-5 miles 1-3 miles 
Table 9.   A Comparison Between WiMAX Standards (After: [27]). 
 
c. WiMAX Interoperability   
The means to IEEE 802.16 interoperability is the IEEE 802.2 Logical Link 
Control (LLC) Service Access Point (SAP), which is common to all IEEE 802 networks. 
It accepts and transmits datagrams and frames then it passes them back through the 
protocol stack to a router. The router relays them to the next network segment [1]. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Protocol Structure (From:  [33]). 
 
The Physical (PHY) layer is frequency-dependant, which means that only 
this layer is to be changed if a different medium is used. Generally, WiMAX uses 
Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technology at the PHY layer [1]. 
Figure 18 depicts that the Physical Medium Independent (PMI) sub-layer 
(top half of layer 1) and the MAC (layer 2) are entirely frequency-independent (layer 




Figure 18.   WiMAX MAC Layer (From:  [33]). 
 
Similar to all IEEE 802 networks, WiMAX is routable. Within the 
network segment, WiMAX has a stable MAC.  The scheduling algorithm in WiMAX 
provides three major benefits: stability under overload, bandwidth efficiency, and ability 
to control QoS. 
OFDM has some advantages over other technologies, lower power 
consumption, minimum bandwidth usage, and efficient bandwidth usage. OFDM 
provides better channel throughput because all of the underlying sub-carriers are 
orthogonal to one another. Table 10 compares the parameters regarding fixed WiMAX 




Table 10.   OFDM Parameters Used in WiMAX (From:  [32]). 
 
d. WiMAX Security (Authenticity)  
The WiMAX security is aimed at improving infrastructure security, and is 
particularly resistant to TOS attacks. It supports encryption, authentication and other 
security mechanisms. WiMAX is vulnerable to a replay attack in which an attacker 
maliciously resends valid frames that the attacker has intercepted in the middle of the 
forwarding (relaying) process. WiMAX increases the level of network security by using 
both terminal and subscriber authentication to stop a possible theft of service.  
Encryption mixes data using a mathematical algorithm with a ciphertext 
output which will be transmitted using the wireless network. The eavesdropper will not 
be able to understand the ciphertext. WiMAX uses Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES), the block cipher ratified as a standard by National Institute of Standards and 
Technology of the United States (NIST), for this process. AES input is a mixture of an 
encryption key and a counter with a bitstream output as shown in the Figure 19. The next 
step is to apply an exclusive OR operation on the bitstream and the data to produce the 
ciphertext. At the receiver, the reverse process will be applied (same encryption key must 
be used at both ends) [28]. 
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Figure 19.   AES Encryption (From:  [28]). 
 
The IEEE 802.16e-2005 standard uses the Privacy and Key Management 
Protocol version 2 (PKMv2) to secure the key transfer between the Base Station (BS) and 
the Mobile Station (MS).  
PKMv2 produces an Authorization Key (AK) which is utilized to derive 
the encryption key. PKMv2 also supports the use of Rivest-Shamir-Adlerman (RSA), 
which is an algorithm for public-key cryptography and it is the first algorithm known to 
be suitable for signing as well as encryption, exchange which requires a manufacturer-
issued X.509 digital certificate or a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card [28]. 
Public-key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, is a 
form of cryptography in which the key used to encrypt a message differs from the key 
used to decrypt it. 
In case of X.509 (X.509 is an International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) standard for a public key infrastructure (PKI) for single sign-on and Privilege 
Management Infrastructure (PMI)) digital certificate, it will contain the mobile station's 
Public-Key (PK) and its Media Access Control address (MAC address) (which is a quasi-
unique identifier assigned to most network adapters or Network Interface Cards (NICs) 
by the manufacturer for identification) which will be validated by a certificate authority 




Figure 20.   Public Key Infrastructure (From:  [28]). 
 
The IEEE 802.16-2005 supports the device and user authentication, 
privacy, and validation. It is able to dynamically refresh keys and detect replay attacks. 
802.16-2004 only requires SS to be authenticated. 802.16-2005 security is better than 
802.16-2004 as it requires both SS and BS to be authenticated [1].  
e. IEEE 802.16 Quality of Service (QoS)  
WiMAX supports high level of Quality of Service (QoS). The WiMAX 
QoS parameters could include traffic priority, burst rate, scheduling type, delay, jitter, 
Service Data Units (SDU) MAC signaling type and size [29]. 
WiMAX, by its MAC, implements bandwidth efficiency and trades off 
other QoS characteristics, which is almost always the correct tradeoff [1]. 
f. WiMAX Evaluation 
An evaluation of WiMAX technology for emergency communications 
could be derived. WiMAX is Hastily Formed Network (HFN) enabled, mobile and usage 
flexibility is in the core of its attributes.  
(1) Performance. WiMAX has a reputation as the best alternate 
solution for wireline-equivalent broadband service. 70 Mbps speeds at 50 Km range are 
often mentioned as the actual performance for users, while this is the total shared 
bandwidth capacity available to multiple users on 2X20 MHz frequency spectrum (2X20 
MHz refers to the Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) mode). Actual per user data rate is 
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1-3 Mbps. The 50 Km usage is for LOS deployments while expected coverage is 1-3 Km 
in urban areas and 5-10 Km in rural areas [33]. 
(2) Low cost CPE availability. WiMAX CPE is still pre-
standard and expensive. It will take years to get the economy of scale limit. 
(3) Fixed-WiMAX vs. ADSL. Broadband in Jordan is 
experiencing breathtaking progress as offers for this service are getting cheaper and 
cheaper. In light of the wired presence, WiMAX has to be very competitive in terms of 
price and services offered. However, in rural areas with poor wireline infrastructure, 
WiMAX is definitely more economic and has benefits over ADSL. When comparing the 
services offered by the two technologies, wired broadband still better than WiMAX. 
Wireline can offer higher bandwidth which supports voice, broadband, TV and Video-on-
Demand to customers [2].  
D. POWER TECHNOLOGIES FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
Communications technologies support systems are vital for the continuity of the 
service during emergencies. Backup power systems should be ready to take over when 
the electricity grid is out of order. It is important to remember that without power, all of 
the advanced technology will not help. Special consideration for power distribution is 
vital as follows [1]: 
1. Storing and Retrieving the Power  
Batteries are the classical solution for storing and restoring power. It limitations 
such as: large size, high weight, and hazardous materials make it logical to think about 
other options such as capacitors. 
2. Estimate the Power Consumption   
An estimate for the power draw results in an estimate for the power sources 
needed on site to provide for 24/7 operation.  
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3. Generators and Fuel Cells  
As generators require refueling; the logistics of fuel in a disaster emergency can 
be a burden.  Wind or crank power may be options along with Photovoltaic cells (PV). 
a. Photovoltaic Cells (PV)  
First developed in the mid-1950s, PV power cells (also named Solar Cells) 
convert light photons into electricity, using panels made of thin films of semiconductors 
materials such as Silicon and Germanium. These systems are friendly for the 
environment, have low-noise, have no fuel consumption, are maintenance-free, and have 
no running cost. Figure 21 shows a basic PV in operation [10]. 
 
 
Figure 21.    Operation of a Photovoltaic Cell (From:  [10]). 
 
 
PV has the potential to be used in emergency systems where the grid 
power is not available. PV works when there is adequate sunlight and should be coupled 
with storage devices (batteries). Power is needed at the fringe, as this is what makes the 
Photovoltaic solution attractive and it can be deployed with each subscriber station. 
b. Mobile Generators  
Generators are centralized power systems which are often not suitable for 
highly distributed applications. Mobile generators are a potential solution but have a 
logistics problem of re-fueling [11]. 
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c. Fuel Cells  
Fuel cell technology is rapidly emerging as an alternative to incumbent 
battery backup power in communications infrastructures. Fuel Cells also allow 
distribution (without the dependence on sunlight), there are new fuel cells emerging that 
are sized for laptops, cell phones, and other portable devices [11]. 
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, different communication technologies was elaborated upon, 
evaluated and compared. WiMAX and WiFi technologies have the potential to be 
employed in the disaster recovery arena. TETRA and iDEN are already implemented in 
Jordan, which is saturated with three GSM operators. 
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VI. JORDAN’S INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY (ICT) ENVIRONMENT  
By the year 2000, Jordan became a full member of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). This membership has led to being fully liberalized in the ICT sector in Jordan by 
the end of year 2004. To eliminate monopoly, the ICT sector has been privatized and 
opened for competition which alleviated the level of services issues to the public [53]. 
Jordan is considered one of the pioneers in the region in the field of ICT. The ICT 
infrastructure and technical human resources are growing fast. A survey of the current 
ICT infrastructure available in Jordan is necessary to craft a suitable Emergency 
Communications Interoperability Plan (JECIP) for Jordan. 
Jordan’s ICT infrastructure is based on Circuit-Switching technologies along with 
ongoing Packet-Switching projects in Jordan. Packet-Switching will be the core 
technology of Jordan’s future ICT infrastructure due its many benefits in comparison 
with Circuit-Switching.  
Analysis should take into consideration the assets of both public and private 
sectors. Following is a discussion of important aspects of the ICT environment in Jordan. 
A. AUTHORITY 
1. The Communications Licensing Authority 
The Communications Industry within Jordan is regulated by the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC). The TRC grants licenses to 
communication operators, supervises the licenses, conducts spectrum management, and 
issues type approval. The TRC has the authority of approval for telephones, facsimile 
machines, modems, PABXs, and all other types of communication services. 
2. The Disaster Management Authority 
The Higher Committee for Emergency and Crisis Management is a country wide 
committee established to deal with disaster related incidents in Jordan. This committee is 
comprised of all bodies and organizations which have the potential and responsibilities 
for public services. In the case of emergencies such as bad weather or an avian flu 
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pandemic event, the committee gathers in an operation center to arrange for response and 
aid to the affected areas. Communication is a key component in the response plan as it is 
vital for different government sectors to perform their tasks efficiently and with mutual 
cooperation and coordination.  
Jordan has a local committee for emergency response planning and crisis 
management for each major component of the country’s government. Jordan’s Armed 
Forces (JAF) is a pioneer in this regard; the committee for emergency and crises 
management is a well-established body and has access to all communications assets 
available. Other components of government have their own committees and react to 
emergencies with respect to their tasks. The Directorate of Public Security (DPS) (Police) 
has a committee which controls its communications network and has nation-wide 
coverage responsibility. The General Civic Defense (GCD) (Fire Fighters) organization 
also has its own committee and reacts to minor emergencies on a daily basis 
The Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MoICT), the 
Ministry of Interior (MoI), and several other agencies have cooperated in the process of 
drafting a national emergency plan for the Jordan’s communication sector. The plan is 
designed to help maintain the communication infrastructure in emergency situations.   
When ready (expected by 2010), Jordan’s National Crisis Management Center 
(NCMC) will be the sole authority which will handle the planning and implementation of 
Jordan’s emergency communication plan. It will take over that authority from MoICT 
and other agencies in this regard. 
The under-construction NCMC is proposed to be the nodal point at the national 
level for disaster mitigation and response which is based upon connecting all parties in 
response to emergencies. 
 The NCMC will consist of several subcommittees such as The National Council 
for Disaster Management which set the policies underlying the national disaster 
management plan. Another subcommittee is the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) which 
will assist in the preparation of the national disaster management plan in terms of  
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information technology and communication.  The Vigilance Groups (VG) subcommittee 
will be spread around the country to monitor disaster signals and will be the first line of 
disaster detection.  
The local government agencies in the area of the crisis will deal with the 
emergency and start reporting to the NCMC through the Vigilance Groups (VG) which 
will evaluate and decide the size of intervention required for the government and other 
agencies. 
3. The Emergency Communications Plans  
Communications systems should provide the means by which resources can be 
accessed, mobilized, managed, and coordinated in both normal and adverse situations. 
Communications systems must therefore employ sufficient communications paths and 
operational capabilities among all participants to facilitate the functional communications 
concepts.  
The following military and security agencies have their own emergency 
communications plans: Jordan Armed Forces (JAF), Directorate of Public Security 
(DPS), Directorate of Civil Defense (DCD), Headquarter of Gendarmerie Forces (GF), 
and General Intelligence Directorate (GID). 
All of the above agencies have a VHF or UHF dispatching Push-To-Talk (PTT) 
system but these systems will be replaced by a TETRA system shortly, so there is no 
need to make any modifications to the current dispatching systems.  
Jordan Armed Forces and Police participate in UN Peace-keeping missions all 
over the world. These missions require versatile types of communications systems, 
especially HF links and satellite phones (Thuraya & Inmarsat).  
The following companies and agencies have their own emergency 
communications plans: Water Management Company, Electricity Generation & 
Distribution Company, Ministry of Information and Communication Technology 
(MoICT), Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. 
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All of the above agencies have a VHF or UHF dispatch Push-To-Talk (PTT) 
systems. Modifications for the current dispatching systems are necessary to be able to 
talk to other agencies and to be connected to the main backbone.  
Recommendations: NCMC (when active) should take over. Agencies with 
dispatching systems should be included in the future TETRA system.   
4. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)  
There are several NGOs in Jordan which contribute to disaster relief activities 
such as The Jordan Red Crescent (JRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). These NGOs are engaged in mitigating natural disasters. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) focuses exclusively in mitigating 
man-made disasters.  
B. JORDAN’S ICT INDICATORS 
For a country of almost six million people, Jordan has 450,000 fixed telephone 
lines and 3 million cellular phones. The government agencies are connected by landline 
phones and fax. The backbone for this landline network is mainly microwave and fiber 
optics. Most of these agencies have cellular phones. The ambulances run by the DPS, the 
JAF and the GCD are equipped with VHF radios. PABX links all government hospitals 
in Amman.  
The following infrastructure components are already active in Jordan: Optical 
fiber (military and civilian), WiMAX (Amman area), Landline (PBX) old circuit 
switching infrastructure), Cellular (GSM), and iDEN.  
The telecom operators should ensure that their systems are resilient for different 
types of disasters ranging from mild snow, floods, and landslides to fire. Jordan is 
susceptible to terrorist attacks as well. The operators should have disaster-kits ready to be 
moved to a disaster site and have a disaster recovery plans standing by to repair damaged 
portions of their network. 
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1. The Fixed Line Sector 
Jordan has been emphasizing the enhancement of their human capital, the 
macroeconomic conditions and the business and government environment. The 
momentum behind this enhancement process includes public private partnerships with 
international and regional companies. This process has been formed to undertake many 
initiatives to achieve countrywide development [53]. 
The current fixed line infrastructure in Jordan is very reliable and robust. 
Enhancements for the Infrastructure such as the establishment of National Broadband 
Network (NBN) will give the network better resilience and reliability. The Internet and 
mobile usage is moving toward better coverage and connectivity. 
There are still bottlenecks for the communication sector in Jordan such as the 
regulatory and affordability issues that impede higher usage of these technologies.  
 
Table 11.   Telecom Main Indicators in Jordan (After:  [12]). 
 
Number of 
Subscribers: 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Fixed Phone 620000 660000 674000 623000 638000 628000 614000 
Mobile & 
Trunking 389000 866000 1200000 1325000 1624000 3138000 4343000 
Paging 12000 4400 4600 2300 2100 2200 2100 
Internet 32000 66000 62000 92000 111000 197000 206000 
Population 4820000 4940000 5070000 5200000 5350000 5489100 5600000 
Main 
Telephone 
lines per 100 
inhabitants 









60 63 60 55 52 64 59 
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The above table gives a metric for penetration without measuring the availability 
in general or at a component level. Redundant connectivity and the presence of backup 
power and the ability to perform fault detection need to be addressed for a true picture. 
2. Mobile Market in Jordan 
In the market of mobile communications, many companies provide coverage and 
services in this booming business. Jordan enjoys high cellular technology users’ count. 
The ratio of cell subscribers to the population is almost 75%. That rate may be reduced to 
50% when omitting users having more than one cell lines. 
In 1995, Fastlink (now Zain) was the first GSM mobile network that started its 
services. By the year 2004 four operators were to compete in the market (3 GSM and 1 
iDEN operator). Table 12 depicts the percentage of market share between those 
operators. 
 
Table 12.   Percentage of Mobile Operators in Jordan’s Communication Market (After:  46]). 
 
TRC published a request for bid for the 3G as a new service in Jordan. If no 
current operator succeeds in acquiring the 3G license, a fifth new operator will start its 
services in Jordan. The following are the mobile operators in Jordan [46]: 
a. Zain Company 
The following figure depicts the map coverage for Zain GSM operator.  
Company Established Technology Subscribers ( end of 2006) 
percentage 
Zain 1995 GSM 900 1,961,000 48% 
Orange 2000 GSM 900 1,405,500 30% 
Umniah 2005 GSM 1800 700,000 10% 
Xpress 2004 iDEN 65,000 2% 
Total 4,131,500 100% 
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Figure 22.   Zain Coverage Map in Jordan (From:  [46]). 
 
Recently, a new era has been started in terms of roaming - led by Zain. 
Zain is an active operator in 22 countries in the Middle East and Africa. A user could call 
any other user in these 22 countries as if they are in one network without the need of 
roaming services. This will make it easier and cheaper for NGOs and other aid agencies 
to talk in different countries. 
b. Orange Company 
The following figure depicts the map coverage for Orange GSM operator. 




Figure 23.   Orange Coverage Map in Jordan (From:  [46]). 
 
c. Umniah Company 
The following figure depicts the map coverage for Umniah GSM operator. 
 
Figure 24.   Umniah Coverage Map in Jordan (From:  [46]). 
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d. Xpress Company 
Jordan’s experience with the iDEN system is not very successful as it has 
only 2% of Jordan’s commercial mobile market (not meant for emergency 
communications services).  The iDEN technology is a Motorola proprietary system which 
makes it an expensive service. The terminals are also expensive and no third party 
produces or maintains iDEN products which will hinder the spread of the service. 
An agreement should be negotiated between those operators to enable 
access for other users for all networks in case of emergency. Another solution for the 
coverage issues is to have mobile base stations which will be deployed in the area of the 
emergency. 
3. The Internet Sector 
Table 13 shows the population statistics in Jordan compared to the growth of the 
Internet. According to the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU’s) table, the 
Internet users in Jordan are growing dramatically. Expectations for Internet usage are to 
grow to 50% by the year 2010. 
 
YEAR Users Population % Pop. Usage Source 
2000 127,300 5,282,558 2.4 % ITU 
2002 457,000 5,282,558 8.7 % ITU 
2005 600,000 5,282,558 11.4 % ITU 
2007 796,900 5,375,307 14.8 % ITU 
Table 13.   Internet Growth and Population Statistics (From:  [12]). 
 
To measure the level of ICT in any country, the e-readiness concept was 
developed. All of the factors of communications and Internet infrastructure which add up 
to a broad concept may be called e-readiness.  The definition of e-readiness is the level of 
preparation of a country to participate and benefit from Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) developments. In other words, the usage level of ICT directly relates 
to conducting standard expected functions of the government and citizens [41]. 
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Table 14 depicts the rank of Jordan with respect to other countries in the world.  
Categories used to test e-readiness include connectivity and infrastructure. Jordan enjoys 
a relatively good position on the scale (medium), which makes it better than many 
neighboring countries.  
 













USA High High High High High 
Singapore High High High High High 
Canada High High High High High/medium 
Ireland High/medium High High High/medium High/medium 
UAE High/medium Medium Medium High/medium Medium/low 
Turkey Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium 
India Medium/low Medium Medium/low Medium High/medium 
Mexico Medium Medium/low Medium/low High/medium Medium/low 
China Medium Medium/low Medium Medium Medium/low 
Jordan Medium Medium Low Medium/low Medium 
Egypt Medium Medium/low Low Medium Low 
Kuwait Medium Medium/low Medium/low Low Low 
Lebanon Low Medium Low Low Low 
Morocco Medium/low Medium/low Low Medium/low Low 




A telemedicine network started in Jordan’s hospitals several years ago. 
Patients X-rays and records are shared through the network. Some National Hospitals 
have telemedicine networks with hospitals in the U.S.  
b. Alert Systems 
Jordan has very limited access to the sea, Aqaba port, so a city-wide alarm 
system is not necessary as the Tsunami threat is very low. Other parts of the country need 
a multipurpose alarm system for public warning from disasters. 
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5. Satellite Phones 
In the case of Jordan, this technology is not well utilized as it is still relatively 
expensive. If necessary, the Thuraya and Iridium networks offer satellite phone coverage 
in the region and other parts of the world which could be used in emergencies inside and 
outside of Jordan. 
6. Wireless Technology in Jordan 
a. WiFi 
In case of Jordan, this technology is evolving and many Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) are implementing hot spot all over the country. Zain and other telecom 
operators started an initiative to make this service available on certain university 
campuses in Jordan. Cafes and Malls started to offer this service as a complementary 
offering to their other services [52]. 
b. WiMAX 
In 2006, Umniah and Atco Companies started the Fixed Broadband 
Wireless Access (FBWA), in other words, WiMAX. 
Umniah, the Jordanian mobile provider and a subsidiary of Batelco 
Bahrain has launched WiMAX services under its new trademark, UMAX. Wi-tribe is the 
second WiMAX ISP operator. Wi-tribe Jordan is a subsidiary of the regional 
telecommunications company Wi-tribe limited, which is a joint venture between Qatar 
Telecom (Qtel) Q.S.C and A.A. Turki Corporation for Trading and Contracting (ATCO) 
of Saudi Arabia [2]. 
WiMAX coverage is still limited to Amman, the capital, but future 
expansion is inevitable. 
C. ICT INITIATIVES IN JORDAN 
Jordan started a National Strategic Plan to reform the communications and 
Information and Communication Technology sectors. This strategy has several themes:  
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elimination of monopoly, withdrawal by Government in favor of a private sector led 
market environment, and, social and demand development through access to education 
and widened opportunity.   
Still there are certain issues that should be clarified, the problem of dual standards 
in governments, as this non-monopoly strategic point should apply to all projects and 
initiatives in progress in Jordan (even if owned by the government).  
New communications technologies are being introduced to the public which made 
the communication infrastructure more advanced and robust. In parallel, the 
commercial/public Internet services have been enhanced. Intranet pilot projects such as 
the Jordanian E-government, E-army, E-health, and E-education are being implemented. 
All of these projects from different public and private sector entities make 
Jordan’s communication environment well defined and relatively sophisticated. This 
advanced infrastructure will reflect on the country’s readiness for disasters and 
emergencies.    
1. Connecting Jordanians Initiative (CJI) Overview 
CJI was introduced by MoICT to improve the lives of Jordanian citizens and 
furnish an infrastructure for the telecommunications sector to bloom. Part of this 
initiative was to establish a broadband learning public access network which links 
schools, colleges, universities, and telecenters by 2005 [53]. 
2. National Broadband Network (NBN) 
For the success of CJI, the need for a broadband fiber network is essential. The 
scope of the project is: University Broadband Network (8 public universities and 9 sites), 
School Broadband Network (3300 public schools, 100 knowledge stations, 17 public 
community colleges, and 12 learning resources centers). NBN is very convenient as a 
backbone for communication safe spots in case of emergencies, with an understanding 
that modifications will be added to the network so that it will meet future emergency 
services needs. Jordan should focus on improving availability in terms of location and 
redundancy as it will be cheaper to implement than creating new infrastructure [53]. 
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Figure 25.   NBN School LAN. 
 
Although both are supported by the same government, NBN is not integrated with 
the emergency services network.  Schools are often emergency services staging sites and 
are often used as refugee centers. This is the reason why extending the Internet using 
WiMAX would be an economic and feasible solution. 
3. E-government Program 
The e-government program mission is to support transformation to enhance the 
government efficiency using information technology and communication tools. Business 
Process Re-engineering (BPR), Human Performances Development (HPD), and 
deploying the best practices with latest technologies are the main aspects of program 
implementation [53]. 
4. TETRA 
In 2006, The Jordanian Defense Ministry awarded Thales Company a contract to 
provide a nationwide TETRA network. The network will include 70 base stations and 
provide secure communications services for 20,000 users. The network is based on a 
distributed architecture qualified under real operating conditions and standard IP routers.  
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TETRA is the ideal for government-to-government and inter-agency 
communications. Other parts of the infrastructure should be tied to this network via 
gateways and proxies which will offer connectivity for citizens in both directions. 
The network can be shared by Jordan’s Armed Forces (JAF) both (Army, Air 
Force, and Special Forces) and will be extended later to include the Directorate of Public 
Security (DPS) (Police), General Civic Defense (GCD) (Fire Fighters) and other 
organizations [25].  
The Jordanian government selected the Thales DIGICOM25 solution to deliver its 
entire nationwide TETRA capability. DIGICOM25, the full TETRA-over-IP 
communications network, is part of a range of solutions using Internet Protocol (IP) to 
communicate over the infrastructure network. It provides TETRA-standard digital 
communications service which includes voice, data, and imagery.  DIGICOM25 allows 
the flexibility of IP routing and distributed configurations which provides high level of 




Figure 26.   DIGICOM25 Network Architecture (From: [37]). 
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DIGICOM25 is developed for both civil and military markets, these innovative 
products make it possible to replace proprietary switches with standard IP routers, 
thereby offering significant savings in terms of both initial outlay and operating costs.  
Dispatching and fleet monitoring functions use Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) 
equipment and is managed on standard PCs running Windows software, making the 
system even more economical. Native security including Class 1 to Class 3 encryption 
and dynamic key management for authentication make network sharing possible. The 
following table depicts the main attributes of the DIGICOM25 system. As mentioned 
above, DIGICOM25, the full TETRA-over-IP communications network, TETRA 
network to be implemented in Jordan is based on a routed technology [37]. 
 
Attribute Description 
Services Half and Full Duplex calls 
Group calls 
PSTN/PABX calls (individual and group) 
Emergency calls , Priority calls 
Security Network class 1,2,3 
End-to-End encryption 
Key management center 
Mutual authentication 
Network Management Statistics tools 
Alarm management (SNMP) 
QoS support mechanisms 
System interface and gateways Dispatcher 
PABX/PSTN ,H.323 VoIP, SDS, DATA gateways 
Automatic Vehicle Locator 
GSM networks 
Table 15.   Thales DIGICOM25 TETRA Solution (After:  [37]). 
 
The users, Jordan’s Armed Forces (JAF) are not enthusiastic about using this 
feature due to security concerns. These concerns include a lack of security of the Internet 
such as viruses and breaches. The users would like to create a closed network. This will 
make it hard to acquire high availability of the network. Also, this will be a fundamental 
incompatibility [1]. The use of this network for public safety is suggested in this thesis 
which needs an administrative decision and technical alteration. 
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 The technology is still under construction in Jordan so no current evaluation is 
available. The attributes and services on paper are promising and if used well will be a 
good solution especially in case of emergencies. 
D. INFORMATION GATHERING DISSEMINATION IN EMERGENCY  
Before a crisis strikes the country, a campaign should be started to create a public 
awareness of the roles of different agencies and governmental divisions in case of 
emergency. Citizens should also understand their roles and responsibilities and what they 
should prepare in their homes and work places to be ready for any emergency. Basic 
survival kits, special radio receivers, extra cell phone batteries, and plugs to charge from 
cars are examples of these precautions. 
There are several communication technologies to be used in case of emergency. 
An assumption that an incident does destroy the communication infrastructure in the area 
will lead to the following procedures to be started: 
1. Gathering Information 
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) provides weather and emergency status to radio 
and TV stations, for remote sites, word of mouth is still a prevalent form of 
communication. SMS and E-mails may be the new methods of information dissemination 
to citizens in the country.  
Call centers will be arranged to receive missing-persons update and get feedback 
information to improve situational awareness in both sides. 
2. Dissemination 
a. TV and Radio Broadcast 
An update for the current status of the incident area will be broadcast via 
TV and radio. An example for an incident is the spread of an epidemic, the information 
and countermeasures needed by citizens disseminated via TV (VHF,UHF) stations, radio 




NCMC disposal for that purpose. Discrete, short, clear, and authenticated messages 
should be broadcasted to include communicating with disabled persons for access to the 
information. 
b. Other Broadcast Media 
New broadcast media will be used such as podcast, SMS, and Internet 
sites. SMS will be arranged through service providers to be sent to all cell phones users.  
The information flow among the various agencies involved in disaster 
relief is currently vague and needs more coordination and planning due to multiple 
agencies and ministries being involved in the process.  
There are four communications needs; each one needs an appropriate 
amount of attention as elaborated in Table 16 [1]: 
 
Communications Need Available Technologies 
Government- Government TETRA, VHF, and UHF dispatch 
networks along with landline phones. 
 
Citizen-Government Call centers and Landline 800 numbers. 
 
Citizen-Citizen GSM and iDEN Networks along with 
Landline Phones. 
 
Government/Military-NGO Community Satellite phones in addition to the above 
means of communications. 
 
Table 16.   The Four Communications Needs in Jordan (After: [1]). 
 
E. INTEROPERABILITY IN JORDAN 
Interoperability in Jordan is still a new concept. There is no specific guidance for 
new equipment procurements. The core of interoperability (nation-wide) is at both the 
agency and agency-to-agency levels. Jordan’s main problematic interoperability issue is 
within the procurement cycle control. Each agency or ministry has its own policies and 
technical requirements [1]. 
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Telecom operators and ISPs in Jordan should adhere to the TRC’s interoperability 
guidelines as part of their license requirements. For military and security agencies, the 
new project TETRA network is under construction. TETRA will connect all of these 
agencies together with one network. Adding a group to this network for users based on 
their role in emergency response would enable all First Responders Community (FRC) 
members to talk to each other easily in case of emergency. 
Frequencies available to user agencies are described with associated special 
assignment limitations by TRC. Some frequencies are shared with more than one agency.  
The national directory for the active frequencies in Jordan is maintained by TRC as it is 
the sole authority for administering the frequency spectrum. 
Most public safety communications radios (portable, mobile, base station and 
repeaters) broadcast frequencies between 30 MHz and 900 MHz which are dedicated to 
public service use. Cell phones and other systems, such as global positioning receivers, 
call boxes, electronic signs, irrigation systems, and mobile command units, that transmit 
information from remote locations, transmit in the microwave band between 1 GHz and 
20 GHz. There are three primary reasons why agencies cannot talk to each other [12]: 
First, there are four distinctive frequency bands (Low VHF, High VHF, UHF, 800 
MHz Band) that are used primarily by the First Responders Community (FRC). 
The second primary reason agencies cannot talk to each others is compatibility, 
even when using radio systems in the same frequency range, some radio vendors’ 
products are not compatible. A bridging device, or gateway, is needed to connect 
disparate radio systems that are operating in the same frequency range.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The main goal of this chapter was to evaluate and analyze Jordan’s ICT 
infrastructure and environment. From the above analysis for Jordanian communication 
environment, it seems that Jordan has two divergent business models: Government-
owned Internet infrastructure and the private sector-owned infrastructure. As mentioned 
earlier, WTO rules are against public-owned ISPs.  
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The solution for this issue is to encourage or facilitate creation of  a private 
company which will be open for investment and will manage and exploit the 
infrastructure on a competitive basis and may be used by citizens and private companies. 
This would help to build an infrastructure with high availability and endurance against 
emergencies. 
Although the dominant trend for the business model in Jordan is toward a private 
sector-owned infrastructure, a lot of work remains to be done to achieve this. GSM 
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VII. A PROPOSED JORDAN’S EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY PLAN (JECIP) 
Based on the technological aspects of emergency communications, Jordan’s 
communications environment, the requirements analysis of emergency communications 
plan, and lessons learned from the U.S. experiences with recent disasters discussed in 
earlier chapters a proposed Jordan Emergency Communications Interoperability Plan 
(JECIP) is introduced in this chapter.  
The aim of this proposed JECIP is to improve the response readiness and 
efficiency of components involved in emergency. Parts of this plan are already in practice 
but the added value relies on the integration of plan components. 
Generally, JECIP includes features such as redundancy for transmission routes, 
spares for vital equipment, backup subscriber management centre, emergency hot-lines, 
paging systems to spread disaster warnings, and rapid upgrading of base stations after a 
disaster. Guidelines for improvements of the plan are introduced. These guidelines are 
expected to be expanded by others in future work to draft a better JECIP for Jordan. 
The core of JECIP is based upon the IP infrastructure. All other available 
infrastructure component and ICT systems are connected to the core through gateways. 
Various communications technologies and equipment types are discussed with a focus on 
performance parameters to evaluate communications equipment. Usually there are three 
qualifiers for equipment selection: economic, technological, and political. 
A. JECIP OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 
1. Objectives 
The main objective of JECIP is to make sure that the current communications 
infrastructure will be allow responders to talk to each other and assure that future 




The scope of this plan is the ICT network infrastructure of Jordan. Interoperability 
is vital, as in cases of emergency; aid from outside Jordan is inevitable. Proper equipment 
and personnel training is important so the concerned agencies will use the same language 
and terminologies when working together in a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR) or Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) environment. 
3. The Threat 
The threat facing Jordan is similar to many countries, there are two types of 
disasters that may affect Jordan, natural and man-made. Fortunately, there have been no 
serious disasters to hit Jordan in the past 20 years. Most of those disasters were mild 
snow storms, low profile earthquakes, and small spread epidemics.   But countries should 
plan for the worst and pray for the best. On the other hand, the main man-made disaster 
faced by Jordan is the bomb blast in Amman that occurred at 9 November 2005 (aka 9/11 
of Jordan). 
4. Plan Revision Procedure  
A major goal in the development and distribution of JECIP has been to establish 
an effective revision procedure to ensure that all necessary information and requirements 
regarding emergency communications are promptly made available to all pertinent 
agencies.  
B. JECIP AUTHORITY 
TRC and NCMC should create an agency which will have the sole authority in 
drafting the interoperability guidelines for modular emergency infrastructure in Jordan. 
The proposed agency may be named Office of Communications Interoperability in 
Jordan (OCIJ). OCIJ (or whatever the new agency ends up being named) should create 
ICT equipment procurement strategies for better life cycle maintainability and make sure 
that the equipment will be interoperable and will be able to talk back to legacy systems. 
OCIJ includes a Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC) to create an interoperability 
testing mechanism and assure vendor eligibility with respect to this testing process. 
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As part of the licensing regime handled by TRC, OCIJ will require that ICT 
systems providers follow certain guidelines relevant to the resilience of Jordan’s ICT 
infrastructure. When TRC is to issue a license to a communications operator, OCIJ 
should have the authority to ratify the license. There are three emergency 
communication-related conditions that should be considered. First; the operator should be 
able to provide public emergency call service to emergency organizations for the purpose 
of an emergency, second is the need to provide plans for the provision and rapid 
restoration of communication services during public emergencies, and third is to provide 
emergency organizations with priority fault repair service fast [12]. 
C. JECIP APPROACH [1] 
The proposed JECIP should leverage the existing Internet infrastructure and add 
the necessary high availability features to keep this fixed Internet component operating in 
all stressed situations. It is necessary to study these components with respect to 
interoperability and build one homogeneous network based on Packet-Switching 
technology and to connect Circuit-Switching components using gateways to the 
backbone. 
The proposed infrastructure should have the ability to connect government to 
citizens and government to government. It also should have scalability for future 
expansion.  
1. Packet-Switching vs. Circuit-Switching Technology 
It is necessary to start building the infrastructure based on Packet-Switching 
technology for its scalability and flexibility. Economical factors play a part as roll-out 
costs are high in areas where Circuit-Switching technology is already installed. Those 
areas should be connected through gateways to the backbone. 
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2. Packet-Switching vs. Agency-owned Dispatching Systems 
While agency-owned dispatching systems meet government to government 
communications needs, the Internet has the ability to meet all three of the 
communications needs in Jordan (citizen-citizen, citizen-government, and government-
government).  
This is the reason why the backbone for the proposed JECIP should be based on 
Internet technologies. 
D. ICT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING STRATEGY 
1. The Backbone 
In this proposed JECIP plan, ICT infrastructure will be comprised of the IP 
network as a backbone. Being a routable network, other infrastructure components in 
Jordan will be connected to this backbone through gateways.  
Figure 27 depicts the FRC network in Jordan. GSM, TETRA, VHF, UHF, NBN 
are connected though gateways to the IP network. Urban and remote areas are connected 
using WiMAX and WiFi fringes. 
 
Figure 27.   ICT Infrastructure Network in Jordan. 
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Figure 28 shows the communications network for Jordan’s FRC members and UN 
troops outside of Jordan. The Thuraya satellite phones are used to connect to the IP 
network through a gateway. 
 
Figure 28.   The Communications Network for Jordan’s FRC Members and UN 
Troops When Outside of Jordan. 
 
In the ICT context, NGOs operating in Jordan and surrounding countries 
(especially Iraq) need to be connected to the ICT infrastructure.  International access to 
the outside world should take into consideration the load of traffic on the network during 
emergencies. 
Figure 29 shows the communications network for NGOs when working in Jordan. 
Connecting to the FCR network in Jordan may be via Gateways or simply by adding a 
group for them with TETRA terminals. 
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Figure 29.   NGOs Connecting to the FRC ICT Infrastructure in Jordan. 
 
Figure 30 shows the NBN network in Jordan which connects schools, 
Universities, and medical facilities (E-health project). These locations should be prepared 
to be shelters for citizens and FRC members in case of emergencies.  
 
 
Figure 30.   NBN Infrastructure. 
 
2. Redundancy 
The concept of back-up communications is, in general, the provision of sufficient 
equipment and procedures to enable an overall improvement in system reliability over 
time.  
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With regard to emergency communications specifically, the concept of back-up 
communications as applied to base stations or other fixed radio equipment is to enable 
primary dispatch communications to continue despite outage of the primary dispatch 
radio base station and to enable tactical communications to continue despite outage of the 
tactical radio base station.  
Redundancy is an important issue to connect different parts of the network firmly. 
It is easily provisioned with routable network technologies not found in circuit switch 
technologies. Wireless technologies such as WiMAX, WiFi, and satellite are strong 
patching tools in case of losing a trunk between important parts of the network. Figure 31 
shows a typical patching network. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Patching and reach out. 
 
In case the communications infrastructure fractures, NCMC will coordinate an 
assessment for the damage and try to patch the crack with one of the available assets. 
Technologies such as mobile GSM local cell with various backhaul connections such as 
WiMAX, satellite, or microwave will be available for the First Responders Community 
(FRC) in the field for the first three hours. 
Evaluation and assessment teams will be on site as soon as possible to estimate 
the damage and decide how much resources are needed and to determine which the 
agency should provide these resources and coordinate these assignments with the 
pertinent authorities. 
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NCMC will work on the expansion of this network patch until the original 
infrastructure is back in service. Other technologies may be used for the same reason: 
satellite phones, WiMAX, WiFi. For the Internet, hotspots and Internet cafes will be 
available for the First Responder Community (FRC), official business, and the public (if 
possible). There will be limitations on streaming video or any big files, although some 
will have priority and should be accommodated – such as access to the missing-persons 
list for updates. 
 
 
Figure 32.   Redundancy Through Wireline. 
 
Dual sites for these Points of Presence (POPs) should be created. All have at least 
two routes to other nodes. Backup power to critical nodes should be added. Fault 
monitoring equipment should be added also to reduce time between faults.  
E. ICT FUNDING AND PROCUREMENT STRATEGY 
1. Implement Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) [1] 
Consideration should be given to implement an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) procurement strategy via the proposed Office of Communications 
Interoperability in Jordan (OCIJ). Procurement committees and funds should have 
policies to help agencies which will cooperate in JECIP implementation. 
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The objective of these policies is to push agencies toward an interoperability 
solution in Jordan. The procurement process of products and services related to 
communications infrastructure will be probed by the OCIJ consultant teams so that they 
will make sure it is interoperable with the current systems.  
The contracts for new communications equipments when conducted through an 
IDIQ procurement umbrella should be interoperable as they are bought from the same 
vendor.  
The proposed OCIJ will help the technical specifications writers of different 
agencies to produce a specification that works with legacy systems already in service and 
interoperable with the systems to be procured in the future.  
Communications systems require specific characteristics that will abide by the 
modularization model discussed in earlier chapters. Poorly written specifications in a 
contract will lead to poorly modularized systems. Agencies with funds outside of this 
IDIQ process will procure based on these specifications. There are at least two 
methodologies in writing specifications: The turnkey and modular approaches.  
OCIJ should work using the modular approach where there will be a contract for 
each major component. Terrestrial-WAN components are included in one contract, radio-
WAN extensions in a second, and end systems (with the applications they host) are in a 
third. 
The modular approach is better than the turnkey approach as the internet is 
extended to mobile platforms, it is cheaper for the agencies to procure through economies 
of scale, and systems have better availability (survivability). 
2. Fund’s Management  
It is obvious that funding for any project is an important aspect for its 
implementation. The following are important funding issues to enhance ICT 
interoperability in Jordan:  
Allocate an appropriate fund from governmental and the private sector for ICT 
interoperability research projects in Jordan. Encourage Cooperation between government 
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agencies, private sector, and NGO’s in terms of personnel exchange, equipment, mutual 
fund, and aid coordination. The government should encourage this type of mutual 
funding which will enhance interoperability and reduce prices due the economy of scale 
principle.  
3. JECIP Implementation Timeframe 
The JECIP implementation will be based on a survey to be conducted in the 
country to assign locations for shelters and to pick schools, religious places, hospitals, 
and other public service locations to be used in case of emergency as connection nodes. 
These connection nodes should be chosen with specific attributes: high immunity against 
natural disasters, that have a backup source of power, and are easy to reach in and out. 
The JECIP implementation timeframe is dependant on several factors: Available 
funds, policies and guideline ratification. Figure 30 depicts the implementation 
achievement percentage if the plan would start in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. 
 
 
Figure 33.   The JECIP Implementation Timeframe. 
 
The implementation of the JECIP is accumulative process divided into 3 phases: 
preparation, implementation, and revision. In FY 2009, 25 percent of the plan will be 
implemented. The next two phases are based on the first step which will lead to an 
interoperable infrastructure in Jordan by the end of FY 2011. 
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F. JECIP TRAINING 
Training is an important aspect of the proposed JECIP. Nationwide exercises and 
public awareness campaigns should be started by the authorities to prepare for the 
communications challenges we expect in disasters. The proposed training system for 
interoperable communications systems in Jordan is a triangle which includes education 
and training, exercise & On-the-Job-Training (OJT), and Certifications. Figure 31 depicts 
the Interoperability Communications Training Triangle (ICTT) in Jordan. 
 
 
Figure 34.   The Interoperability Communications Training Triangle.  
 
1. Education and Training 
Education and Training for FRC members in Jordan is a vital factor that will 
prepare them to work together in the field. Continuous exercise programs for agencies in 
Jordan should be encouraged, focusing on using the same language and terms so that they 
will communicate efficiently in a real disaster. 
2. Exercises and On Job Training (OJT) 
A knowledgeable individual that will play a key role in the acquisition of the 
technology should lead to interoperable systems. The current training is based on 
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technical training along with operational training which comes with the system 
procurement: training on equipment maintenance, operating the equipment and network 
training, and exercises in emergency communication scenarios.  
Exercises similar to Strong Angel III (SAIII) should be part of the annual 
activities of all agencies working in the field of emergency communications. The 
exercises should be realistic and adhere to the available assets and limitations. It is a fact 
that the more that FRC members know their equipment, the more they will be able to see 
interoperability problems which will lead to solutions before the real emergency strikes. 
3. International Cooperation 
International cooperation in the communication domain of Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) or the Stability & Reconstruction (S&R) domain is 
inevitable. Mutual exercises with other countries and participation in international 
conferences and exercises are important to achieve ICT interoperability through exposure 
to other nation’s experiences in this field. 
4. Certifications 
Currently, certification is a common methodology for measuring professionalism 
of FRC members. Certifications tracks for individual working in both operational and 
technical communications interoperability should be included as part of JECIP. The two 
tracks should have definitions for the three stages of training: beginner, intermediate, and 
professional. 
G. SUMMARY 
The main goal of this chapter was to propose Jordan’s Emergency 
Communications Interoperability Plan (JECIP) and to outline guidelines to be used for 
improvements and enhancement of the plan with an aim of developing a more robust plan 
to be crafted in future. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK   
Through the analysis of the different aspects of communications in emergency 
situations, some recommendations may be derived, such as whether Jordan should 
continue to invest in primarily POTS telephone infrastructure with Packet-Switching 
infrastructure. In the military domain, the unique nature of Jordan’s Armed Forces (JAF) 
makes it fit for emergency response activities in the country and during peace keeping 
missions around the world. 
The recommendations and future work introduced in this chapter may be used to 
enhance resilience of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Systems in 
Jordan in case of emergency. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Conduct a series of seminars and workshops on JECIP and start its 
implementation in Fiscal year 2009. 
2. Create a national JECIP steering committee that would take a holistic view 
of communications interoperability emergencies in Jordan and develop a compelling 
vision for it including definition and strategic objectives. The committee should represent 
both the public and private sectors. 
3. Jordan should continue on a faster pace with its e-initiatives such as PC@ 
every home, Jordan's Broadband Learning Network, and Knowledge Stations to increase 
PC and Internet penetration rations. 
4. Encourage cooperation between government agencies, private sector, and 
NGO’s.  This should be encouraged in terms of personnel exchanges, equipment, funds, 
and aid coverage. 
5. Early warning systems should be deployed in identified potential likely 
locations of disasters. 
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6. Privatization of all ICT initiatives and projects is necessary to comply with 
WTO regulations and open competition norms which will make services better and viable 
infrastructure.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
The research in this domain is still open, and there are many things to be done. 
Another task would be to draft a new emergency plan for Jordan taking into account the 
recommendations and discussions in this thesis. 
The future work on communication in emergency may be continued in the 
following tracks: 
1. Work on an emergency communication interoperability plan for Jordanian 
troops participating in United Nation’s Peacekeeping missions. 
2. Use the experience of different countries in the emergency communication 
domain to enhance Jordanian plans and procedures. 
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